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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES D. KENT,
Grievant/Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 920676-CA

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY, and the
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
OF THE STATE OF UTAH,

Argument Priority No. 13

Agency / Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
As stated by Grievant/Petitioner at page 2 of his Brief,
this case is an appeal from a final agency action of the Career
Service Review Board.

Utah Code Ann. Section

67-19-30(2)

(Supp. 1992) provides that grievances based on dismissal from
employment are governed by Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46b, Utah
Administrative
Review Board

Procedures

Act

(UAPA).

The

Career

Service

(CSRB) has designated all of its adjudicative

1

proceedings as formal for purposes of UAPA Section 63-46b-4.
See Utah Admin- Code R137-1-17.B. (1992).
Grievant/Petitioner Kent (Grievant) asserts in his Brief,
page 1, that:
Utah Code Annotated 63-46b-16(l) (1953, as
amended) confers jurisdiction upon the
Supreme Court or other appellate Courts, a.s
provided by statute. to review all final
agency actions resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings.
[Emphasis
added.]
Grievant further asserts that Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a3(2)(a) (1992 & Supp. 1992) grants jurisdiction of this case to
this Court.
UAPA Section 63-46b-l(8) (1989 & Supp. 1992), states:
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted
to provide an independent basis for
jurisdiction to review final agency action«
This provision is consistent with the language of UAPA Section
63-46b-16(l), "As provided by statute . . .".

Clearly, UAPA

Section 63-46b-16(1), only becomes operational if some statute
other than the UAPA confers jurisdiction on this Court.
This Court has previously held that U.C.A. Section 78-2a3(2)(a) does not by itself confer jurisdiction on this Court to
review final agency action.
Board of Appeals, 764 P.2d

See DeBry v. Salt Lake County
627

(Utah App. 1988), in which

Jackson, J. speaking for the Court said, referring specifically
to Section 78-2a-3(2)(a):
This general statute defines the outermost
limits of our appellate jurisdiction,
2

allowing us to review agency decisions only
when the legislature expressly authorizes a
right of review. [Citations omitted.] It
is not a catchall provision authorizing us
to
review
the
orders
of
every
administrative agency for which there is no
statute specifically creating a right to
judicial review. In the absence of such a
specific statute, we have no jurisdiction.
[Emphasis added.]
Id., at pages 627-628.
Grievant may be entitled to seek an extraordinary writ
under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (URCP) .
See Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555
P.2d 281 (Utah 1976).

But to this point Grievant has plainly

failed to state a jurisdictional basis for his appeal.
The balance of this brief is written on the assumption
that this Court may conclude it does in fact have jurisdiction
apart from Rule 65B to consider Grievant's appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues raised by Grievant are actually sub-issues of
the

primary

issue.

Respondent

Department

of

Employment

Security (Department) believes the issues should be stated as
follows:
1.

Can

a

Schedule

State
B

employee

pursuant

with

to

career

U.C.A.

service

Section

status

of

67-19-15(2)(b)

(Supp. 1992) be terminated under U.C.A. Section 67-19-18
(Supp. 1992) and its implementing rules because of the
employee's

conviction

of
3

the

crime

of

forging

an

endorsement on a U.S. Treasury check issued against the
Federal Social Security Fund?
a.

Did the CSRB abuse its discretion by affirming the
Department's reliance on "professional standards"?

b.

Did the CSRB abuse

its discretion by determining

there was a nexus between Grievant's off-duty conduct
and his employment?
c.

Did the CSRB abuse its discretion by holding that
Grievant may be terminated

from one position for

misconduct that occurred while he held a different
position in the Department?
Grievant has stated in his brief, at pages 2-3, that the
standard of review for each of the foregoing issues requires
"analysis

for

correctness".

The

Department

standard of review urged by Grievant.

disputes

the

The standard of review

of CSRB cases will be discussed in depth in Point I of the
Argument herein.
STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The statutes and rules which are determinative of this
matter are set forth verbatim in Appendix A, and include the
following:
Utah Code
Supp.).

Ann.

Section

63-46b-l

(1991

Utah Code
Supp.).

Ann.

Section

63-46b-4

(1991

4

Utah Code
Supp.).

Ann.

Section

63-46b-16

(1991

Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-18(1) (1986 &
Supp. 1992).
Utah Code Ann. Section 67-19-30(2) (Supp.
1992) .
Utah Admin. Code R468-11-1 (presently 47711-1) (effective July 1, 1991).
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-17.B. (1992).
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-20 (1992).
Other references by Grievant to statutes or rules are not
relevant to this case.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
By notice dated October

4, 1991, Grievant's immediate

supervisor advised Grievant that the supervisor intended to
recommend to the Department Administrator, Mr. Floyd G. Astin,
that Grievant be dismissed

from his employment

for cause.

After conducting a pre-termination hearing, Mr. Astin issued a
disciplinary

decision

dated

December

Grievant effective December 6, 1991.

3,

1991, terminating

(See Appendix B)

Grievant advanced his grievance of the dismissal to Step 5
at the CSRB.

A hearing was held before a CSRB hearing officer

on February 7, 1992.
March

The hearing officer issued a decision on

31, 1992, upholding

Grievantfs

employment.

5

dismissal

from

State

Grievant then advanced his grievance to Step 6 at the
CSRB.

The CSRB adopted the findings of its hearing officer

and upheld Grievant's dismissal by decision dated October 20,
1992.

Grievant thereafter filed his Petition for Review with

this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Grievant's Statement of Facts is incomplete and contains
two errors.

The facts pertinent to this case and to the

Grievantfs termination are as follows:
Grievant was hired by the Department on October 9, 1984 as
an Accountant, in a

non-career status.

Record at 293-294

(All notations hereafter prefixed by "R" refer to pages in the
record which are set forth in numerical order in Appendix C.)
On January 13, 1986, Grievant1s employment status was changed
to

Career

Service

Schedule

B.

R.

296

In January

Grievant was promoted to the position of Field Auditor.

1989

R. 308

Grievant's duties from the time of his hire until his
promotion in January, 1989, consisted of collecting employer
contributions and benefit overpayments owed to the Unemployment
Insurance Fund, a trust fund created by U.C.A. Section 35-4-9
(1988).

R. 308-310, 312-313, [Ag. Exh. 5 at R. L81]

Upon

promotion to the position of Field Auditor, Grievant assumed
the additional duties to audit employers, verify quarterly wage

6

reports and assess employers for deficiencies in reported wages
and contributions.

R. 310, 312, [Ag. Exh. 6 at R. 182]

On May 1, 1991, Grievant was indicted by a Federal Grand
Jury

on

ten

Security

(10) counts of

checks made

period in 1986.

fraudulently

endorsing

out to his deceased

R. 316, 406

Social

father during a

Grievant's immediate supervisor.

Mr. Don Avery, learned about the indictment from a Department
employee and asked Grievant if he was the person indicted by
the Federal Grand Jury.

R. 316-317

Grievant then explained to

Mr. Avery what had transpired

and

R. 317

restricted

Mr. Avery

thereupon

"professed his innocence".
Grievant's

duties

(R. 317), placed him under close supervision (R. 318), advised
him

that

a

guilty

ple^

or

conviction

could

impact

his

employment (R. 319), and instructed Grievant to keep Mr. Avery
informed of the progress of the case.
Grievant

was

placed

R. 320

on restricted

duties pending

the

outcome of his case because Field Auditors hold a very high
profile position in the Department.

R. 318, line 23

through

R. 319, line 10; R. 323, line 21 through R. 324, line 2

They

continually handle trust fund monies, have access to employers'
confidential financial information, and even quite often are
given checkbooks by employers in which pre-signed blank checks
are kept.

R. 323-324,

Mr. Avery became the Chief of Contributions about the
first of August, 1992, some time
7

after

the

retirement

of

Mr.

Dean Kimber.

R.

334-335

Despite having

instructed

Grievant in 1991 to keep Mr. Avery informed, Grievant failed to
give any information to Mr. Avery unless and until Mr. Avery
requested updates.
Although

R. 326-327, 414

Grievant

alleges

that

he

told

Mr.

Avery's

predecessor, Mr. Dean Kimber, about an August 8 court date,
Mr. Avery had been aware only that Grievant was scheduled for a
court appearance "sometime in the fall", and was not informed
of the scheduled court appearance for August 8, 1992, until
another supervisor in the Department
R. 327

called

him

about it.

Grievant did not at any time prior to August 8, 1992,

tell Mr. Avery about the scheduled court appearance, and in
particular did not let Mr. Avery know of Grievant's intent to
plead guilty.

R. 327, 402

On August 8, 1993, Grievant pled guilty to one count of
fraudulently endorsing a United States Treasury check dated
September 3, 1986, in the amount of $310.
Exh. 3, at R. 164; AG. Exh. 2, at R. 176]

R. 329, 393, [GR.
On September 13,

1991, Mr. Avery addressed a letter to his supervisor in which
he reported the fact of Grievant's guilty plea and concluded
that if the offense did not justify termination that Grievant
be transferred out of the Contributions Section.

R. 330 [GR.

Exh. 2, at R. 163]
After

receiving

verbal response to his

letter, on

October 4, 1991 Mr. Avery gave Grievant a notice of intent to
8

discipline through dismissal.

R. 331, [Ag. Exh. 3, at R. 177]

Grievant filed a written response to the notice of intent to
discipline and thereafter Mr. Avery issued a recommendation to
the

Administrator,

Mr.

dismissed for cause.

Floyd

G.

Astin,

that

Grievant

be

R. 332

On November 15, 1991 Mr. Floyd Astin conducted a Step 4
informal

pre-termination

hearing

with

Grievant

to

hear

Grievant's response to Mr. Avery's recommendation of dismissal.
R. 333, 354

The result of the hearing was a written decision

by Mr. Astin, issued on December 3, 1991, in which Mr. Astin
concluded

that

communicate

Grievantfs

openly

and

"act

of

honestly"

forgery
with

his

and

failure to

supervisor

had

disabled Grievant from being able to work effectively as an
employee

of the

Department.

R. 354-356,

[Ag. Exh. 1,

at

R. 173]
Grievant thereafter pursued his appeal rights with the
CSRB and this Court.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Whether this appeal comes to the Court as an appeal of
right or as a Rule 65B petition for extraordinary writ because
of a lack of other adequate remedy at law, the standard of
review on the factual findings is that such findings will be
upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence when the
record is reviewed as a whole.
9

The Court will determine whether the sanctions imposed by
the Department on the employee were disproportionate to the
offense

by

discretion.

considering

whether

the

Department

abused

its

The standard of review for determining whether

there was an abuse of discretion is the intermediate standard.
That is, the Court will affirm the employee's dismissal if that
sanction is reasonable and rational under the circumstances of
the case.
The

findings

of

fact

at

Step

4

(the Administrator's

decision), Step 5 (the hearing officer's decision), and Step 6
(the CSRB's decision) are supported by substantial evidence in
the record.

Those findings are sufficient to justify the

sanction of dismissal.
The Grievant had actual or constructive notice of the
conduct that was expected of him.

His conduct, both at the

time he committed the crime of forgery and when he failed to
inform his supervisor of the progress of the federctl criminal
case, caused the Department to lose confidence and trust in
Grievant.

This loss of confidence and trust was directly

related to Grievant's employment and occurred while he held
positions for which such confidence and trust are vital.
dismissal from State service was appropriate.

10

His

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS WILL AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD IF THERE IS A FACTUAL
BASIS TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE EMPLOYING
DEPARTMENT AND THE SANCTION OF DISMISSAL IS NOT
DISPROPORTIONATE AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
This Court has recently stated that:
The CSRB's role in examining
the
Department's personnel actions is a limited
one. The CSRB is restricted to determining
whether there is factual support for the
Department's charges against [grievant]
and, if so, whether the Department's
sanction
of
dismissal
is
so
disproportionate to those charges that it
amounts to an abuse of discretion.
Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 443
(Utah App. 1991) .

This conclusion by the Court was based, in

part, on a rule of the CSRB found at Utah Admin. Code R665-125.4

(1987-88), which at the time of the Despain decision

required

the

CSRB

hearing

officer

to

"give

latitude

and

deference" to the agency's decision.
The rule applicable to this case is found at Utah Admin.
Code R137-1-20 (1992), which provides in part:
C.
Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing.
An
evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new
hearing for the record, with both parties
being accorded full administrative due
process.
The hearing officer shall give
latitude and consideration to an agency's
prior decision when the latter is supported
by the findings of fact based on the
evidence. [Emphasis added.]
11

It should perhaps be noted that this rule was amended effective
January, 1993, and is presently considerably more detailed than
the version of the rule that appears in the 1992 Utah Admin.
Code.

However, the CSRB rule once again requires the CSRB

hearing officer to "give deference" to the agency decision if
the factual findings support the agency's allegations.
While

the

change

in

wording

from

"deference"

to

"consideration" and back to "deference" could be reviewed from
the perspective of the dictionary meanings of the words, the
history of the CSRB's rule and prior court decisions appear to
make

it plain

that

the

role

of

the

CSRB

is

.Limited to

determining whether there is factual support for the agency's
allegations
discretion

and,
in

if

so,

imposing

whether

th€>

the

sanction

agency
of

abused

dismissal.

its
See

Despain, at pages 442-443.
Although Despain is not quite as clear on the role of the
appellate courts in reviewing a CSRB decision, the outcome of
Despain clearly demonstrates that this Court will apply the
same standards to its review of a CSRB decision as the Court
applies to the role of the CSRB in reviewing the Agency's
decision.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FACTUAL FINDINGS.

To

determine

decision

of

the

whether
CSRB,

there

this

is factual

Court
12

applies

support
a

for a

"substantial

evidence" standard.

See UAPA, Section 63-46b-16(4)(g).

This

standard has been stated as:
. . . [T]his court grants great deference
to an agency's findings and will uphold
them if they are "supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court".
[Citation
omitted.] "Substantial evidence" has been
defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."
[Citations
omitted.]
In applying the substantial
evidence test, we review the "whole record"
before the court, and consider both
evidence that supports the Board's findings
and evidence that fairly detracts from
them. Id. It is the petitioner's duty to
properly present the record, by marshaling
all of the evidence supporting the findings
and showing that, despite that evidence
and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn therefrom, the findings are not
supported
by substantial
evidence.
[Citations omitted.]
Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App.
1991).

Two very recent appellate court decisions confirm this

standard.
Rep.

33

See King v. Industrial Commission. 209 Utah Adv.
(Utah App.

1993) ; and

Semeco

v.

Utah

State Tax

Commission, 209 Utah Adv. Rep. 73 (Utah 1993).
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR AGENCY ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
As stated above, the appellate courts of Utah will review
the question of whether a sanction imposed by a State agency is
so disproportionate to the charges against the employee as to
amount

to

an

abuse

of

discretion.

13

The

section

of UAPA

applicable

to

this

type

suggests

in

of

review

is

Section

63-46b-

16(4)(h)(i).
Grievant

his

Brief

that

the

appropriate

standard of review is an "analysis for correctness".
Grievant

offers

no

explanation

for

that

However,

conclusion.

Respondents believe the conclusion is in error for the reasons
set forth in the following paragraphs.
It appears clear from the cases cited above that the
appellate courts of this State have already determined that the
imposition

of

sanctions

discretionary act.

against

a

State

employee

is

a

As such, the appellate courts will apply a

standard of reasonableness and rationality to the exercise of
such discretion.
However,

in

See King v. Industrial Commission, supra.
Semeco

the

Supreme

Court,

through

A.C.J., stated:

But if t h e r e i s no d i s c e r n i b l e
l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t as t o how a s t a t u t e
should be i n t e r p r e t e d or applied, Morton
suggests
that
a challenge
to
the
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e
s t a t u t e could c o n s t i t u t e a subsection
(4)(h)(i)
challenge
and so r e c e i v e
intermediate review.
Morton thus d i r e c t s
c o u r t s and a t t o r n e y s t o c a r e f u l l y consider
whether
a particular
agency
action
c o n s t i t u t e s a simple i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or
application
of
law,
reviewed
under
subsection ( 4 ) ( d ) , or merely an e x e r c i s e of
implicitly
delegated
discretion
to
i n t e r p r e t or apply the law, reviewed under
subsection ( 4 ) ( h ) ( i ) .
209 Utah Adv. Rep., a t pages 78-79.

14

Howe,

The

statutory

provision

itself, U.C.A.

Section

67-19-

18(1), appears on its face to contain an explicit grant of
discretion to State agencies:
(1)
Career service employees may be
dismissed or demoted only to advance the
good of the public interest, and for just
causes such as inefficiency, incompetency,
failure to maintain skills or adequate
performance
levels, insubordination,
disloyalty to the orders of a superior,
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in
office. [Emphasis added.]
The language "such as" indicates a legislative intent not to
limit application of the law only to the offenses enumerated.
Furthermore, the offenses enumerated within the provision are
subject to two or more interpretations, although past court
decisions

in

Utah

and

other

jurisdictions

may

provide

considerable guidelines for such interpretations.
The Supreme Court, in its first detailed analysis of UAPA
Section 63-46b-16, provided guidance that has become more clear
as additional cases have developed.

In Morton International,

Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814
P.2d 581 (Utah 1991), the Court explained:
When there is no discernible
legislative intent concerning a specific
issue the legislature has, in effect, left
the issue unresolved. In such a case, it
is appropriate to conclude that the
legislature has delegated to the agency to
decide the issue.
Such an approach is
particularly appropriate when it is
reasonable to assume that the legislature
intended the agency to have some discretion

15

in dealing with the statutory provision at
issue, [Emphasis added.]
814 P. 2d, at page 589.
That

the

legislature

intended

state

agencies

to have

discretion in dealing with employees is almost self-evident.
As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Matter of Discharge of
Jones,

720

P.2d

1356

(Utah

1986),

agencies

have

the

responsibility to manage their employees:
The second Vetterli inquiry, whether the
charges warrant the sanction imposed, is a
limited one. The sheriff must manage and
direct his deputies, and is in the best
position to know whether their actions
merit discipline. If the Merit Commission
finds upon review that the facts support
the charges against the deputy, then it
must affirm the sheriff's disciplinary
action, unless it finds the sanction so
clearly disproportionate to the charges as
to amount to an abuse of the sheriff's
discretion.
[Citation omitted; emphasis
added.]
720 P.2d, at page 1363.
Given the language of the statute it seems rather obvious
that its application is an exercise of delegated discretion to
interpret

and

16(4) (h)(i),

apply
and

application

of the

16(4)(d).

Thus,

the

not

law

just

under
a

UAPA

simple

intermediate

standard

or

Section 63-46bof

reasonable and rational is appropriate for this case.
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63-46b-

interpretation

law itself, under UAPA
the

Section

review

of

Furthermore, in defining the term "abuse of discretion" in
the context of State employee grievances this Court quoted in
Despain from a California case as follows:
[I]f the penalty imposed was under all the
facts and circumstances clearly excessive,
this will be deemed an abuse of discretion.
. . .
In determining whether there has
been an abuse of discretion the Supreme
Court of this state [California] has stated
that "If reasonable minds might differ as
to the propriety of the penalty imposed,
this fact serves to fortify the conclusion
that the [administrative body] acted within
the area of its discretion."
824 P.2d, at page 448 [quoting from Szmaciarz v. California
State Personnel Board, 79 Cal. App.3d 904, 145 Cal.Rptr. 396,
405-406 (1978).]
Finally, the rules of the Department of Human Resource
Management

(DHRM) ,

which

has

the

duty

to

oversee

the

implementation of the State Merit laws, has promulgated its
rules,

acknowledging

the

disciplining their employees.

discretion

agencies

have

in

Specifically, Utah Admin. Code

R468-11-2.(2)(d) (1991) provides:
(2)(d)
Following such a hearing [the
hearing before the agency head] an employee
may be dismissed or demoted if the
department head finds adequate cause or
reason. [Emphasis added.]
See also Utah Admin. Code R468-11-1.(4) (1991).
As will be demonstrated in POINTS II and III of this
Brief, the findings of the Administrator of the Department of
Employment Security, the CSRB hearing officer, and the CSRB
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itself, are supported by substantial evidence in the record,
and the sanction imposed against the Grievant in this case,
given all of the circumstances that exist in the case, was
reasonable and rational.
POINT II
THE SANCTION OF DISMISSAL IMPOSED ON GRIEVANT WAS
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE OF RECORD.
Grievant was discharged for two reasons:
guilty

to the

Treasury

crime

check, which

of
he

forging

First, he pled

an endorsement

committed

while

on a IKS.

employed

by the

Department in a position involving collection of monies for the
Unemployment Insurance Fund.

Second, he failed to keep his

supervisor informed about the progress of the federal criminal
case against him, as he had been specifically instructed to do.
Both the CSRB hearing officer and the CSRB itself agreed that
there was substantial evidence to support the factueil findings
of the Department's Administrator.
When an appellant disagrees with the findings of fact of
an agency, the appellant has the duty to marshal all of the
evidence, both for and against the disputed findings.

Grace

Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App.
1989); Department of Air Force v. Swider, supra at 448, 451 In
the instant case Grievant has set forth in his Brief a partial

18

partial statement of the facts, but has not identified specific
findings which Grievant considers in dispute.
Instead, Grievant has simply stated his version of two
key findings alleging that:

1) Grievant specifically told Dean

Kimber about the August 8, 1991 court date at which Grievant
pled guilty to fraud or forgery; and 2) an individual named
Iturbe told Grievant that he, Iturbe, would "take care" of
reporting to the Department about the outcome of the August 8
court hearing.

Based on these "facts", Grievant argues that

his dismissal was improper.
This Court has repeatedly said that it will not disturb
findings of fact unless the appellant can demonstrate that the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.

Stewart v.

Board of Review, 831 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992); Grace
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, supra; Johnson v. Board of
Review, 842 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1992).

Compare Ohline Corp. v.

Granite Mill, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah App. 1993).
With respect to Grievant's argument that he told the
former Chief of Contributions about his August 8 court date,
and that a Mr. Iturbe would "take care" of the reporting, the
record is clear that even if these matters were true, they did
not comply with the instructions Grievant was given by his own
supervisor, Mr. Don Avery, to keep Mr. Avery informed of the
progress of his case.
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Mr. Avery testified in the Step 5 evidentiary hearing as
follows:
Q.

Did you ask Mr. Kent [Grievant] to keep you
informed of the progress of the case
against him?

A.

Yes, I did.
I asked him if —
if
throughout this process, if he would keep
me updated as to what was transpiring so
that I was aware of — of the situation,.
R. 320, lines 11-16

Q.

At any time did he ever come to you and
say, "I need to bring you up-to-date on my
case," or anything to that effect?

A.

Not once.

Q.

In fact, you had to ask him every
what was going on?

A.

Yes. R. 326,
line 3

Q.

But he did not come to you at any time
prior to August 8th to let you know that he
had a court date?

A.

No, he did not.

line 22,

time

through R. 327,

R. 327, lines 19-22

In addition, Mr. Astin, the Department Administrator,
testified in the Step 5 hearing before the CSRB hearing officer
that he asked Grievant why Grievant did not keep his supervisor
informed about his case, and Grievant failed to explain why or
that he informed anyone else:
Q.

Did Mr. Kent ever state to you either
his hearing or at any other time that
had told the Chief of Contributions
that time, Mr. Dean Kimber, that he had
August 8th hearing date?
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in
he
at
an

A.

No. As a matter of fact, that did not come
out. The questions were asked as to why he
didnft inform his supervisor, and that was
never mentioned he did inform anybody.

Q.

Did Mr. Kent say to you at any time that he
had told Mr. Kimber or anybody else that he
intended to plead guilty at that August 8th
date?

A.

Again, that was asked and there was no
indication of doing that. R. 379, line 21
through R. 380, line 9

Grievant did not at any time during his Step 5 hearing
dispute Mr. Astin's testimony on this point, but only reasserted

his

position

that

he

kept

Mr.

Kimber

informed.

Grievant did admit in his own testimony, however, that he did
not inform anyone of his decision to plead guilty in a plea
bargain.

See R. 402, lines 18-22

Grievant's testimony that he talked to Mr. Dean Kimber
about his federal case caused Grievant1s supervisor, Don Avery,
a certain amount of frustration, as evidenced by Mr. Avery's
testimony on Rebuttal in the Step 5 hearing:
Q.

Again,
what
were your instructions to
Mr. Kent about keeping you informed?

A.

Please, keep me updated on the progress of
the situation so that I'll know how to
respond, I'll know how to react, so that
nothing comes as a surprise to me.

Q

Did you ask him to keep Mr. Kimber informed
instead of —

A.

No, I did not.
I was his immediate
supervisor.
This thing should have been
handled through me, unless Mr. Kimber had
told me otherwise and I was not told such.
R. 414, lines 1-12
21

Mr, Avery explained the impact Grievantfs guilty plea and
failure to keep Mr. Avery

informed had on him and why he

decided to recommend removal of Grievant from the Contributions
Section in the following words:
Q.

And why did you make that request?

A.

It was obvious now that I cannot have an
individual who had pled guilty to a federal
offense of forgery handling trust fund
monies.
R. 330, line 25 through R. 331,
line 3

Q.

As far as the ultimate outcome prior to
August 8 th, did you have any reason to
believe that Mr. Kent had, in fact,
committed fraud against the Federal
Government?

A.

I did not.

Q.

And when he pled guilty, how
change your attitude?

A.

I quite honestly felt betrayed.
lines 2-4

R. 350, lines 17-21
did

that

R. 351,

Mr. Avery's testimony immediately following the excerpts
quoted
failure

above went on to explain that the guilty plea and
to

keep

Mr.

confidence in Grievant.

Avery

informed

caused

him

to

lose

See R. 351, line 8 through R. 352,

line 4
Grievant

asserts

that

he

had

no

notice

"professional standards" adopted by the Department.

of

any

The focus

of this argument is simply that the Grievant claims he did not
understand what conduct was expected of him.

The Department's

Supervisor's Handbook is clear and unequivocal about what forms
22

of conduct may be cause for dismissal.
dismissal clearly

The list of causes for

includes "Conviction

of a crime of moral

turpitude91.
Grievant
Supervisor's

argues

that

Handbook.

he
He

did

not

have

access

failM

in

address

Mr.

to the
Astin's

testimony that new employees are given information of what
standards

of

conduct

employees

have

are

access

expected

to the

of

them,

Super vi sorf s

and

that

Handbook.

all
See

R. 370, lines 16-25, and [GR. Exh. 1, at R. 1 16]
In addition, Mr. Avery testified that on more than one
occasion he advised Grievant that a conviction or guilty plea
could have an impact on Grievant's job.

See R. 319, line 18

through R. 320, line 5
All

of

the

foregoing

quotations

of

testimony

and

references to exhibits show that the factual allegations of the
Department nte

supported by substantia.! ijvirt<nce in the tecord.

Grievant has failed to marshal the evidence and demonstrate why
any of the findings of the hearing officer or CSRB are not
supported b\ the record.

Under these circumstances the Court

should conclude that the findings of fact are correct and
supported by substantial evidence.
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POINT III
THE DECISION TO DISMISS GRIEVANT WAS A REASONABLE
EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT'S DISCRETION GIVEN THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
Grievant argues on appeal that the Department erred in
dismissing Grievant for three reasons:
failed

to

prove

it

has

adopted

1) the Department has

objective,

identifiable

professional standards; 2) there is no nexus between Grievant's
guilty plea and his employment with the Department; and 3)
Grievant's misconduct occurred while he served in a different
"office" than the one from which he was dismissed.
The

CSRB

hearing

officer

addressed

the

first

issue,

whether Grievant violated a known standard of conduct, and
concluded:
It seems to be generally understood that an
employee's reputation for honesty and
trustworthiness must be without question,
This is especially true in a sensitive
position such as Grievant's where trust
fund moneys are involved.
Hearing Officer's decision, R. 7.
The CSRB addressed the same issue in the following manner:
It is not relevant that Appellant
[Grievant] had not received a copy of the
Department's Supervisor Handbook prior to
his dismissal.
Proper conduct and
professional standards include certain
moral standards that do not need to be
explicitly written and disseminated to each
employee in the public work force.
A
serious offence in criminal law, such as
forgery, for one who holds a position such
as an Accountant, a Collections Officer,
and a Field Auditor, rises to a level of
24

moral turpitude. . . . Clearly a universal
standard of truthfulness, integrity,
trustworthiness, and a reputation not
blemished by an act or acts of forgery may
be expected of one holding the job title of
"auditor". . . *
CSRB Decision, R. 271.
The Department's policy concerning dismissals for cause is
clear.

It does not conflict with any of the reasons set out in

the statute.

Conviction of a crime of moral turpitude is

equally as serious if not more so than mere inefficiency or
failure

to

maintain

skills.

It

is

synonymous

with

incompetency in the sense that by such a conviction one is
rendered

incompetent to perform his duties as such duties

relate to handling monies t"dc

belong

lo d tru^t fund, or

auditing employers for compliance with their legal obligations
to that trust fund.
"incompetency" as

Indeed, Black's Law Dictionary defines
"Lack of ability, legal qualification or

fitness to discharge the required duty."

[Emphasis added.]

As pointed out by the Arizona Court of Appeals, tue very
nature

of the civil

service

employer/employee

relationship

makes it infeasible to spell out in detail all conduct which
will result in discharge.

Civil Service Commission of City of

Tucson v. Livingston, 22 Ariz. App. 183, 525 P.2d 949, cert,
denied 95 S.Ct.1685, 421 U.S. 951, 44 L.Ed.2d 105 (1974).
is sufficient if the employee has fair

otic* oJ the employer*s

policies either expressly, or fairly implied.
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It

Ibid.

The Department's policy is a matter of record.

It is in

complete conformance with DHRM's policies.
Concerning

Grievant's argument that there is no nexus

between his misconduct and his job with the Department, the
Department contends that Grievant's guilty plea to the crime of
forgery of a U.S. Treasury check, coupled with his failure to
keep his supervisor
caused

the

Grievant.

informed of the progress of his case,

Department

management

This is particularly

to

lose

confidence

in

important when an employee

holds a highly sensitive position that requires unquestioned
trustworthiness

and

honesty.

Grievant's

conduct, both

in

committing the crime of forgery and of failing to keep his
supervisor

informed

as

instructed,

rendered

Grievant

ineffective as an employee.
As stated by the Department's Administrator in his Step 4
decision:
Given the facts of your case, I have no
alternative but to conclude that your act
of forgery and failure to communicate
honestly and openly with your supervisorhas
disabled
you
from
continued
effectiveness as an employee of the
Department.
[Ag. Exh. 1, at R. 175]
Although Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain, supra,
is not controlling in this case because Grievant herein was not
a law enforcement officer, there is valuable instruction in
Despain.

For one thing, Grievant as both a Collections Officer
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and as a Field Auditor, held positions of trust with fiduciary
responsibilities to a trust fund.
Grievant's

In addition, as in Despain,

failure to keep his supervisor

informed

of the

status of the federal case against him was "directly relevant
to the requirements of hi s position",

824 P 2d, at page 447.

Grievant argues that he cannot be dismissed for conduct
that occurred prior to his appointment as a Field Auditor.
This argument is based on the Utah case of State v. Bowen, 62 0
P.2d

72

(Utah

Grievant

1980)

acknowledges

and
that

other
Bowen

cases
and

cited
the

by

other

Grievant.
cases all

involved elected officials, whereas Grievant was a State career
service employee.

That distinction is highly significant.

Grievant's reliance on U.C.A. Section 77-5-1
misplaced-

(1953) is

The dismissal of state career service employees is

governed by Section 67-19-18. Although the language is similar
in that both statutes cone] ude wi th the words "I n office", the
words obviously cannot have the same meaning

for a career

service

or

employee

as

they

do

for

an

elected

appointed

officer, because the career service employee is not appointed
for a fixed term.
A case closely

in point was decided by the Court of

Appeals of Ohi o in 1978.

A secretary was hired by the Ohio

Department of Health as a clerk-typist,

Sometime after her

hire she pled guilty to one count of theft by deception; she
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had accepted welfare payments to which she was not entitled.
The court held:
. . . The phrase "in office" means acts
which occur while the officer or employee
in the classified service is employed and
not such acts occurring before the officer
or employee becomes employed.
Craddolph v. Ackerman, 385 N.E.2d 1091, 1093 (Ohio App. 1978).
The Ohio court also found sufficient nexus existed because the
secretary's

duties

included

handling

confidential

medical

documents, thus requiring honesty and trustworthiness.

Id. ,

385 N.E.2d at page 1092.
In addition, the Administrator's decision relied not only
on Grievant's conviction as grounds for dismissal, but also on
Grievant's failure to "communicate honestly and openly" with
his supervisor.
employed

as

a

This conduct occurred while Grievant was
Field

Auditor.

Given

these

facts

and

circumstances, the Department did not abuse its discretion when
it

concluded

that

Grievant

must

be

dismissed

from

State

service.
CONCLUSION
Grievant held positions of trust with the Department:
first as a Collections Officer, and later as a Field Auditor.
While serving as a Collections Officer Grievant committed the
crime of forging a U.S. Treasury check.

Later, while working

as a Field Auditor, Grievant pled guilty to a crime of moral
28

turpitude, forgery.

Grievant failed to keep his supervisor

informed of the progress of the criminal case against him,
despite having been instructed to do so.
Under

these

circumstances

the

Department

had

alternative but to dismiss Grievant from his employment.

no
The

decision of the CSRB affirming the Departments decision to
dismiss Grievant should, itself, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of April, 1993.

K. Allan Zabel
Attorney for Agency/Respondent
Department of Employment
Security
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STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
Judicial review — Type of relief.
Judicial review — Stay and other temporary remedies pending final disposition.
Civil enforcement.
Emergency acjjudicative proceedings.
Declaratory orders.
Transition procedures.

63-46b-0.5. Short title.
This act is known as the "Administrative Procedures Act."
iwi

CO

rr
3
Q

3
"3

63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter.
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except
as otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every
agency of the state of Utah and govern:
(a) all state agency actions that determine the
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or
other legal interests of one or more identifiable
persons, including all agency actions to grant,
deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw,
or amend an authority, right, or license; and
(b) judicial review of all such actions.
(2) The provisions of this chapter do not govern:
(a) the procedures for promulgation of agency
rules, or the judicial review of those procedures
or rules;
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in
the payment of a tax, the decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of, and
penalties or interest on, taxes, or the issuance of
any tax assessment, except that the provisions of
this chapter govern any agency action commenced by a taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of those actions;
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition,
to the granting of pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the rescission, termination, or revocation of parole or
probation, to actions and decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge, conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the discipline of,
resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the Utah State
Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center,
or persons in the custody or jurisdiction of the
Division of Mental Health, or persons on probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions;
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline,
employ, transfer, reassign, or promote students
or teachers in any school or educational institution, or judicial review of those actions;
(e) applications for employment and internal
personnel actions within an agency concerning
its own employees, or judicial review of those actions;
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment
under Title 35, Chapter 9, Utah Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1973, and Title 58,
Chapter 55, Utah Construction Trades Licensing
Act, except that the provisions of this chapter
govern any agency action commenced by the employer, licensee, or other person authorized by
law to contest the validity or correctness of such
a citation or assessment;
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(g) state agency actions relating to manage,
ment of state funds, and contracts for the puj..
chase or sale of products, real property, supplie8
goods, or services by or for the state, or by or for
an agency of the state, except as provided in such
contracts, or judicial review of those actions;
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter
1, Article 3, Powers and Duties of Commissioner
of Financial Institutions, and Title 7, Chapter 2
Possession of Depository Institution by Commissioner, Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah Industrial Loan
Corporation Guaranty Act, Title 7, Chapter 19
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or
Holding Companies, and Title 63, Chapter 30
Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review
of those actions;
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemployment benefits, the initial
determination of any person's eligibility for benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Worker's Compensation, and Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, or the initial determination of a person's unemployment tax liability;
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of monetary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, development, or the arts, or judicial review of those
actions;
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or
order under Title 26, Chapter 8, Utah Emergency
Medical Services System Act, Title 19, Chapter 5,
Water Quality Act, Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe
Drinking Water Act, Title 19, Chapter 2, Air
Conservation Act, or Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1,
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act, except that the
provisions of this chapter govern any agency action commenced by any person authorized by law
to contest the validity or correctness of any such
notice or order,
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required
by federal statute or regulation to be conducted
according to federal procedures;
(m) the initial determination of any person's
eligibility for government or public assistance
benefits;
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and certificates of registration;
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603.
(3) The provisions of this chapter do not affect any
legal remedies otherwise available to:
(a) compel an agency to take action; or
(b) challenge an agency's rule.
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior
to the beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the
presiding officer during an adjudicative proceeding
from:
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with
parties and interested persons to:
(i) encourage settlement;
(ii) clarify the issues;
(iii) simplify the evidence;
(iv) facilitate discovery; or
(v) expedite the proceedings; or
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment if the requirements of Rule
12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules
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63-46b-3

Civil Procedure are met by the moving party,
agency's rules, or by statute to conduct an
except to the extent that the requirements of
adjudicative proceeding.
those rules are modified by this chapter.
(ii) If fairness to the parties is not comproih) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Secmised, an agency may substitute one presidtion 63-46b-21 are not governed by this chapter,
ing officer for another during any proceedexcept as explicitly provided in that section.
ing.
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings
(iii) A person who acts as a presiding offiauthorized by Section 63-46b-21 are governed by
cer at one phase of a proceeding need not
this chapter.
continue as presiding officer through all
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from
phases of a proceeding,
nacting rules affecting or governing adjudicative
(i) "Respondent" means a person against
e
llceedings or from following any of those rules, if
whom an adjudicative proceeding is initiated,
ike rules are enacted according to the procedures outwhether by an agency or any other person.
hned in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
(j) "Superior agency" means an agency reRulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the required or authorized by law to review the orders
quirements of this chapter.
of another agency.
(7) If the attorney general issues a written deter(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from
mination that any provision of this chapter would designating by rule the names or titles of the agency
result in the denial of funds or services to an agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility for
adjudicative proceedings before the agency.
isss
0f the state from the federal government, the applicability of those provisions to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary to prevent the denial. 63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proThe attorney general shall report the suspension to
ceedings.
the Legislature at its next session.
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 63-46b-20, all adjudicative proceedings shall be comprovide an independent basis for jurisdiction to re- menced by either:
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are
view final agency action.
commenced by the agency; or
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown,
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings
are commenced by persons other than the
from lengthening or shortening any time period preagency.
scribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial review.
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(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and
served according to the following requirements:
6346b-2. Definitions.
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writ(1) As used in this chapter:
ing, signed by a presiding officer, and shall in(a) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an
clude:
agency action or proceeding described in Section
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all
63-46b-l.
persons to whom notice is being given by the
(b) "Agency" means a board, commission, depresiding officer, and the name, title, and
partment, division, officer, council, office, commailing address of any attorney or employee
mittee, bureau, or other administrative unit of
who has been designated to appear for the
this state, including the agency head, agency emagency;
ployees, or other persons acting on behalf of or
(ii) the agency's file number or other refunder the authority of the agency head, but does
erence number;
not mean the Legislature, the courts, the gover(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceednor, any political subdivision of the state, or any
ing;
administrative unit of a political subdivision of
(iv) the date that the notice of agency acthe state.
tion was mailed;
(c) "Agency head" means an individual or body
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicaof individuals in whom the ultimate legal authortive proceeding is to be conducted informally
ity of the agency is vested by statute.
according to the provisions of rules adopted
(d) "Declaratory proceeding" means a proceedunder Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or foring authorized and governed by Section
mally according to the provisions of Sections
S3-46b-2l.
63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(e) "License" means a franchise, permit, certi(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be
fication, approval, registration, charter, or simiformal, a statement that each respondent
lar form of authorization required by statute.
must file a written response within 30 days
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person
of the mailing date of the notice of agency
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all reaction;
spondents, all persons permitted by the presiding
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all performal, or if a hearing is required by statute
sons authorized by statute or agency rule to paror rule, a statement of the time and place of
ticipate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding.
any scheduled hearing, a statement of the
(g) "Person" means an individual, group of inpurpose for which the hearing is to be held,
dividuals, partnership, corporation, association,
and a statement that a party who fails to
political subdivision or its units, governmental
attend or participate in the hearing may be
subdivision or its units, public or private organiheld in default;
zation or entity of any character, or another
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
agency.
be informal and a hearing is required by
(h) (i) "Presiding officer" means an agency
statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted
head, or an individual or bodv of individuals
bv rule and mav be requested bv a partv

HrrniNuiA M \raye

63-46b-4

<2

1
rr

-3

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

ment that the parties may request a hearing
within the time provided by the agency's
rules;
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which the adjudicative
proceeding is to be maintained;
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and
telephone number of the presiding officer;
and
(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and, to the extent known
by the presiding officer, the questions to be
decided,
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the agency shall:
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each
party;
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if
required by statute; and
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to
any other person who has a right to notice
under statute or rule.
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than the agency to initiate
adjudicative proceedings, that person's request
for agency action shall be in writing and signed
by the person invoking the jurisdiction of the
agency, or by his representative, and shall include:
(i) the names and addresses of all persons
to whom a copy of the request for agency
action is being sent;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known;
(iii) the date that the request for agency
action was mailed;
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and
jurisdiction under which agency action is requested;
(v) a statement of the relief or action
sought from the agency; and
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons
forming the basis for relief or agency action.
(b) The person requesting agency action shall
file the request with the agency and shall send a
copy by mail to each person known to have a
direct interest in the requested agency action.
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or
more printed forms eliciting the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for agency action when completed and filed
by the person requesting agency action.
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review
a request for agency action and shall:
(i) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is granted and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed;
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing
that the request is denied and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that
the party may request a hearing before the
agency to challenge the denial; or
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine
the agency's response to the request.
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection
(3)(d)(ii) shall contain the information required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to disclosure required by Subsection
(3)(d)(ii) of this section.
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d) to all parties, ex-
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cept that any notice required by Subset
(3)(d)(iii) may be published when public^ 0 *
l0
is required by statute.
&
(iii) The notice required by Subs*w
(3)(d)(iii) shall:
****
(A) give the agency's file number
other reference number;
**
(B) give the name of the proceed:
(C) designate whether the proceed*1*'
is one of a category to be conducted i*
formally according to the provision. !!i
rules enacted under Sections 63-4AWJ
and 63-46b-5, with citation to the apnT
cable rule authorizing that designate %
or formally according to the provision
of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(D) in the case of a formal adjudica.
tive proceeding, and where respondent
parties are known, state that a written
response must be filed within 30 days of
the date of the agency's notice if mailed,
or within 30 days of the last publication
date of the agency's notice, if published:
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be formal, or if a hearing is to be held in
an informal adjudicative proceeding
state the time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which the
hearing is to be held, and that a party
who fails to attend or participate in a
scheduled and noticed hearing may be
held in default;
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to
be informal, and a hearing is required
by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and may be requested by
a party within the time prescribed by
rule, state the parties' right to request a
hearing and the time within which a
hearing may be requested under the
agency's rules; and
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding officer.
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions
are not governed by this chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or actions
are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency action seeking review must be filed
with the agency within the time prescribed by the
agency's rules.
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by rule, provide for a longer
response time than allowed by this section, and may
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable federal law.
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or
order, applications for licenses filed under authority
of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not considered
to be a request for agency action under this chapter.
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is
to award a license or other privilege as to which there
are multiple competing applicants, the agency may,
by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the award of that license or
privilege.
1988
63-46b-4. Designation of adjudicative proceedings as formal or informal.
(1) The agency may, by rule, designate categories
of adjudicative proceedings to be conducted infor-
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mally according to the procedures set forth in rules
enacted under the authority of this chapter if:
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not
violate any procedural requirement imposed by a
statute other than this chapter;
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the
parties to the proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures;
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative efficiency will be enhanced by categorizations; and
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings
outweighs the potential benefits to the public of a
formal adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Subsection (3), all
agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules
shall be conducted formally in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter.
(3) Any time before a final order is issued in any
adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer may
convert a formal ao\judicative proceeding to an informal adjudicative proceeding, or an informal adjudicative proceeding to a formal adjudicative proceeding if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and

(b) conversion of the proceeding does not
unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.
19S7
63-46b-5. Procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings.
(1) If an agency enacts rules designating one or
more categories of adjudicative proceedings as informal adjudicative proceedings, the agency shall, by
rule, prescribe procedures for informal adjudicative
proceedings that include the following:
(a) Unless the agency by rule provides for and
requires a response, no answer or other pleading
responsive to the allegations contained in the notice of agency action or the request for agency
action need be filed.
(b) The agency shall hold a hearing if a hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing
is permitted by rule and is requested by a party
within the time prescribed by rule.
(c) In any hearing, the parties named in the
notice of agency action or in the request for
agency action shall be permitted to testify,
present evidence, and comment on the issues.
(d) Hearings will be held only after timely notice to all parties.
(e) Discovery is prohibited, but the agency
may issue subpoenas or other orders to compel
production of necessary evidence.
(0 All parties shall have access to information
contained in the agency's files and to all materials and information gathered in any investigation, to the extent permitted by law.
(g) Intervention is prohibited, except that the
agency may enact rules permitting intervention
where a federal statute or rule requires that a
state permit intervention,
(h) All hearings shall be open to all parties,
(i) Within a reasonable time after the close of
an informal adjudicative proceeding, the presiding officer shall issue a signed order in writing
that states the following:
(i) the decision;
(ii) the reasons for the decision;
(iii) a notice of any right of administrative
or judicial review available to the parties;
and
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(iv) the time limits for filing an appeal or
requesting a review,
(j) The presiding officer's order shall be based
on the facts appearing in the agency's files and
on the facts presented in evidence at any hearings.
(k) A copy of the presiding officer's order shall
be promptly mailed to each of the parties.
(2) (a) The agency may record any hearing.
(b) Any party, at his own expense, may have a
reporter approved by the agency prepare a transcript from the agency's record of the hearing.
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes
any investigative right or power given to an agency
by another statute.
1988
63-46b-6.

P r o c e d u r e s for formal

adjudicative

proceedings — Responsive pleadings.
(1) In all formal adjudicative proceedings, unless
modified by rule according to Subsection 63-46b-3(5),
the respondent, if any, shall file and serve a written
response signed by the respondent or his representative within 30 days of the mailing date or last date of
publication of the notice of agency action or the notice
under Subsection 63-46b-3(3)(d), which shall include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference
number;
(b) the name of the adjudicative proceeding;
(c) a statement of the relief that the respondent seeks;
(d) a statement of the facts; and
(e) a statement summarising the reasons that
the relief requested should be granted.
(2) The response shall be filed with the agency and
one copy shall be sent by mail to each party.
(3) The presiding officer, or the agency by rule,
may permit or require pleadings in addition to the
notice of agency action, the request for agency action,
and the response. All papers permitted or required to
be filed shall be filed with the agency and one copy
shall be sent by mail to each party.
198S
63-46b-7.

Procedures for formal

adjudicative

proceedings — Discovery and subpoenas.
(1) In formal adjudicative proceedings, the agency
may, by rule, prescribe means of discovery adequate
to permit the parties to obtain all relevant information necessary to support their claims or defenses. If
the agency does not enact rules under this section,
the parties may conduct discovery according to the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(2) Subpoenas and other orders to secure the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence in
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the
presiding officer when requested by any party, or
may be issued by the presiding officer on his own
motion.
(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes
any investigative right or power given to an agency
by another statute.
1987
63-46b-8.

Procedures for formal

adjudicative

proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i)
and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a
hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a
party, the presiding officer:
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(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
statute governing the agency or, in the absence
of such a venue provision, in the county where
the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business.
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
and shall include:
(i) the name and mailing address of the
party seeking judicial review;
(ii) the name and mailing address of the
respondent agency;
(iii) the title and date of the final agency
action to be reviewed, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of
the agency action;
(iv) identification of the persons who were
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action;
(v) a copy of the written agency order from
the informal proceeding;
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain
judicial review;
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the
type and extent of relief requested;
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the
petitioner is entitled to relief.
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in
the district court are governed by the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and any
constitutional issue presented in the pleadings.
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply in judicial proceedings under this section.
1990
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all
final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal acjjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review
of agency action with the appropriate appellate
court in the form required by the appellate rules
of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional filings
and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the
agency's record for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the
record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or
organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of
law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

5)
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rui
*
which the agency action is based, is uncongt**? ***
,ttt%
tional on its face or as applied;
l>,
(b) the agency has acted beyond the juri^i
tion conferred by any statute;
"'i^ttc*
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issm*
requiring resolution;
^*
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted »
applied the law;
°*
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful pro. cedure or decision-making process, or has failed *
to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action wer*
illegally constituted as a decision-making body
or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determi.
nation of fact, made or implied by the agency
that is not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before
the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facte and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the in.
consistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, lass
63-46b-17. Judicial review — T y p e of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal a4judicative proceedings by the district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or
compensation only to the extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of
agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for
further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of
final agency action are reviewable by a higher court,
if authorized by statute.
i987
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay and other
temporary remedies pending final disposition.
(1) Unless precluded by another statute, the
agency may grant a stay of its order or other temporary remedy during the pendency of judicial review,
according to the agency's rules.
(2) Parties shall petition the agency for a stay or
other temporary remedies unless extraordinary circumstances require immediate judicial intervention.
(3) If the agency denies a stay or denies other temporary remedies requested by a party, the agency's
order of denial shall be mailed to all parties and shall
specify the reasons why the stay or other temporary
remedy was not granted.
(4) If the agency has denied a stay or other temporary remedy to protect the public health, safety, or
welfare against a substantial threat, the court may
not grant a stay or other temporary remedy unless it
finds that:
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History: C. 1963, 67-19-17, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, | 23.
Meaning of "this act". — See note under
same catchline under 5 67-19-11.

6749-18

Cross-References. — Grievance and appeals procedure, dismissal of employee, placement on reappointment roster at discretion of
board, } 67-19-26.

67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disciplinary action — Procedure — Reductions in
force*
(1) Dismissals or demotions of career service employees shall only be to
advance the good of the public interest, and for such just causes as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance
levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance,
malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office. There shall be no dismissal for reasons
of race, sex, age, physical handicap, national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other non-merit factor including the exercise of rights under this
chapter. The director shall promulgate rules governing the procedural and
documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions.
(2) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal
to the department head as provided in Subsection (3).
(3) No person shall be demoted or dismissed from a career service position
unless the department head or designated representative has observed the
following procedures:
(a) The department head or designated representative notifies the employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion;
(b) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have
the reply considered by the department head;
(c) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department
head or designated representative; and
(d) Following the hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if
the department head finds adequate cause or reason.
(4) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of workload,
or lack of work shall be governed by retention rosters established by the
director. Under such circumstances:
(a) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be eliminated, subject to review by the director;
(b) Temporary and probationary workers shall be separated before any
tenured employee;
(c) Retention points for each tenured employee shall be computed according to rules promulgated by the director allowing appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in state government, including
any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state
appointment. Tenured employees shall be separated in the order of their
retention points, the employee with the lowest points to be discharged
first; and
(d) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in force
shall be placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection

APPENDIX A (Page 7)
67-19-18

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

67-19-18. Dismissals and demotions — Grounds — Disciplinary action — Procedure — Reductions in
force.
(1) Career service employees may be dismissed or demoted only to advance
the good of the public interest, and for just causes such as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or
nonfeasance in office.
(2) Employees may not be dismissed because of race, sex, age, physical
handicap, national origin, religion, political affiliation, or other nonmerit factor including the exercise of rights under this chapter,
(3) The director shall establish rules governing the procedural and documentary requirements of disciplinary dismissals and demotions.
(4) If an agency head finds that a career service employee is charged with
aggravated misconduct or that retention of a career service employee would
endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public
interest, the employee may be suspended pending the administrative appeal
to the department head as provided in Subsection (5).
(5) (a) No career service employee may be demoted or dismissed unless the
department head or designated representative hats complied with this
subsection.
(b) The department head or designated representative notifies the employee in writing of the reasons for the dismissal or demotion.
(c) The employee has no less than five working days to reply and have
the reply considered by the department head,
(d) The employee has an opportunity to be heard by the department
head or designated representative.
(e) Following the hearing, the employee may be dismissed or demoted
if the department head finds adequate cause or reason.
(6) (a) Reductions in force required by inadequate funds, change of
workload, or lack of work are governed by retention rosters established by
the director.
(b) Under those circumstances:
(i) The agency head shall designate the category of work to be
eliminated, subject to review by the director.
(ii) Temporary and probationary employees shall be separated before any career service employee,
(iii) (A) Career service employees shall be separated in the order
of their retention points, the employee with the lowest points to
be discharged first.
(B) Retention points for each career service employee shall be
computed according to rules established by the director allowing
appropriate consideration for proficiency and for seniority in
state government, including any active duty military service fulfilled subsequent to original state appointment,
(iv) A career service employee who is separated in a reduction in
force shall be:
(A) placed on the reappointment roster provided for in Subsection 67-19-17(2): and
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(B) reappointed without examination to anv vn^a« e v u
the employee is qualified which occurs within one Jvl°r 0IIfrtS
in
date of the separation.
(c) (i) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may anneal to
the department head for an administrative review.
(ii) The notice of appeal must be submitted within 20 workine dava
after the employee's receipt of written notification of sroaration
(iii) The employee may appeal the decision of the department head
according to the grievance and appeals procedure of this act
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L.
1979. ch. 139, 5 24; 1983, ch. 332, 5 9; 1991,
ch. 204, « 6.
Amendment Notes.-The 1991 amendment, effective Apnl 29, 1991 divided former
Subsection (1) into present Subsections (1)
hrough (3); redesignated former SubsecUons
2) through (4) as present Subsections (4)
through (6); in Subsection (5), added the Subsection (a) designation and redesignated for-

mer Subsections (a) through (d) as wo^n* <s,.k_
sections (b) through (e); in SuWfcm m
added the (a), (b), (b)(iv)(A) and CB), and (cXii)
and (iii) designations, added Subsection
(b)(iii)(A), and redesignated former S ~
tion8 (a) ^
h { e ) „ Subsections frM*
™
^
m i ) m m m m*)
and ( x,
^
JJ22S&
a n d m a d c m - nor
ch
thro h o u t £ , ^ ^VUt P ^ a t i o n
*
*

67-19-19. Political activity of employees — Rules and regulations — Highway patrol — Hatch Act .
Except as otherwise provided by law or by rules promulgated under this
section for federally aided programs, the following provisions apply with regard to political activity of career service employees in all grades and positions.
(1) State career service employees may voluntarily participate in political activity subject to the following provisions:
(a) if any state career service employee is elected to any partisan
or full-time nonpartisan political office, that employee shall be
granted a leave of absence without pay for times when monetary
compensation is received for service in political office;
(b) no officer or employee in career service may engage in any
political activity during the hours of employment, nor may any person solicit political contributions from employees of the executive
branch during hours of employment for political purposes; and
(c) partisan political activity may not be a basis for employment,
promotion, demotion, or dismissal, except that the director shall
adopt rules providing for the discipline or punishment of a state officer or employee who violates any provision of this section.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no member
of the Utah Highway Patrol may use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with an election or affecting the
results of an election.
(b) No person may induce or attempt to induce any member of the
Utah Highway Patrol to participate in any activity prohibited by this
subsection.
(3) Nothing contained in this section may be construed to:
(a) preclude voluntary contributions by a state
employee to the
f
%
partv or candidate nf tV*A nfR^^« —

*
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cancy for which the employee is qualified which occurs within one year of
the date of the separation.
(e) An employee separated due to a reduction in force may appeal to the
department head for an administrative review. The notice of appeal must
be submitted within 20 working days after the employee's receipt of written notification of separation. The employee may appeal the decision of
the department head according to the grievance and appeals procedure of
this act.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-18, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, 5 24; L. 1983, ch. 332, 5 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment deleted "where funds have expired or
work no longer exists" in the first sentence of
Subsection (1); deleted "of personnel" after Mdirector" in the last sentence of Subsection (1);
deleted "of personnel management after director in Subsection (4); added Subsection
(4Xe); and made minor changes m phraseology

act," referred to in the last sentence in Subsection (4)(e), literally means Laws 1983, ch. 332,
§§ 1 to 9, which appear as various sections
throughout this chapter (see Table of Session
Laws in Parallel Tables volume). However,
g i v e n t n e context in which it is used, it seems
t h a t t h e ^ ^ ig m e a n t to r e f e r to U w 8 1 9 7 9 >
^ ^
c h 139> § § x to 3 5 g ^ n o t e un<Jer g a m e
5 67.19.1L
U n e following
C ros8-References. - Grievance and appeal

"MfiSySftH. «c,». - « . ta. Ihb »"»»*•* • •»•»«•
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d, — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service 55 52 to 90.
A.L.R. — Determination as to good faith in

abolition of public office or employment subject
to civil service or merit system, 87 A.L.R.3d
1166.
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(b) permit partisan political activity by any state employee who is
prevented or restricted from engaging in the political activity by the
provisions of the federal Hatch Act.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-19, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 139, ( 25; 1982, ch. 75, i 1; 1984
(2nd S.S.), ch, 17, 1; 1988, ch. 122, 5 25.
Amendment Notes, — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted
"that employee" for "such employee" in Subsection (l)(a); substituted "may any person" for
"shall any person" in Subsection (1Kb); deleted
"but nothing in this section shall preclude voluntary contributions by a state employee to the
party or candidate of the officer's or employee's
choice" at the end of Subsection (1Kb); substituted "may not" for "shall not" in Subsection
(l)(c); deleted "of the Division of Personnel
Management" following "director" in Subsec-

tion (l)(c); substituted "adopt rules" for "promulgate rules" in Subsection (l)(c); designated
former Subsection (l)(d) as Subsection (2); substituted "Utah" for "State" before "Highway
Patrol" in two places in Subsection (2); substituted "of an election" for "thereof at the end of
Subsection (2)(a); substituted "by this Subsection" for "herein" at the end of Subsection
(2Kb); designated former Subsection (2) as (3);
substituted "in this section may" for "herein
shall" at the beginning of Subsection (3); in-i
serted Subsection (3)(a); inserted subdivision
designation (b) in Subsection (3); and made
minor stylistic changes.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Eligibility of Public
Officers and Employees to Serve in the State
Legislature: An Essay on Separation of

Powers, Politics, and Constitutional Policy,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 295 (1988).

67-19-20 to 67-19-25. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 repeals
former § 67-19-20, as last amended by Laws
1983, ch. 301, § 2 and Laws 1983, ch. 320,
§ 81; and § 67-19-21, as last amended by Laws
1988, ch. 122, § 26, creating the Personnel Review Board and providing for the submission of
charges under grievance and appeals procedure, effective April 24, 1989. Laws 1990, ch.
93, § 41 repeals § 67-19-21.1, as enacted by
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 284, relating to proce-

dures for adjudicative proceedings, effective
April 23, 1990. Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 repeals §§ 67-19-22 to 67-19-24, as enacted by
Laws 1979, ch. 139, §§ 28 to 30 and
§ 67-19-25, as last amended by Laws 1988, ch.
101, 5 4 and Laws 1988, ch. 122, § 27, concerning grievance and appeals procedure, effective
April 24, 1989. For present provisions, see
Chapter 19a of this title.

67-19-28. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1989, ch. 191, § 22 repeals
§ 67-19-28, as enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 139,

§ 34, providing for the merger of civil service
systems prior to January 1, 1980.

67-19-30. Grievance resolution — Jurisdiction.
(1) Employees shall comply with the procedural and jurisdictional requirements of this section, Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act,
and Title 67, Chapter 19a, Grievance and Appeal Procedures, in seeking resolution of grievances.
(2) All grievances based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression,
including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, commission, or condition shall be governed by Title 67, Chapter 19a, Grievance
and Appeal Procedures, and Title 63, Chapter 46b. Admmistr**ivo P—*<*
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(3) All grievances involving classification or schedule assignment shall be
governed by Section 67-19-31 and are designated as informal adjudicative
proceedings as defined by Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act
(4) All grievances by applicants for positions in state government involving
an alleged discriminatory or prohibited employment practice shall be governed by Section 67-19-32 and Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act,
(5) A "grievance" under this chapter is a request for agency action for
purposes of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act
History: C. 1953, 67-19-30, enacted by L.
1989, ch. 191, § 3; 1991, ch. 204, § 6; 1992,
ch. 193, J L
Amendment Notes. --The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, inserted Gnevance and Appeal Procedures" following 'Title
67w in Subsections (1) and (2), "are exempt
from the procedures of in Subsection (3), and
made minor stylistic changes throughout the
section.

The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, in Subsection (3), substituted "designated as informal adjudicative proceedings as
d e f m e d hy» f o r « e x e m p t f r o m t h e procedures
r
p
'«-, ,. ~ .
. iA,
f
i n o n ~,
Effect e
* ?» t e *' 7 L*™ W89, Chapter 191
k
became
effective on April 24,1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19-31. Classification or position schedule assignment
grievances — Procedure.
(1) Upon receipt of a classification or position schedule assignment grievance, the administrator of the Career Service Review Board shall refer the
grievance to the director.
(2) (a) The director shall assign the grievance to a classification panel of
three or more impartial persons trained in state classification procedures.
(b) The classification panel shall determine whether or not the classification assignment was appropriate by applying the statutes, rules, and
procedures adopted by the department that were in effect at the time of
the classification or schedule change.
(c) The classification panel may:
(i) obtain access to previous audits, classification decisions, and
reports;
(ii) request new or additional audits by department or agency personnel analysts; and
(iii) consider new or additional information.
(d) The classification panel may sustain or modify the original decision
or make a new decision.
(e) The classification panel shall report its decision and findings to the
director, who shall notify the grievant
(3) (a) Either party may appeal the panel's decision to a classification committee appointed by the director.
(b) The director shall appoint a classification committee composed of
three or more department directors representing both large and small
agencies to hear the appeal.
(c) The classification committee shall review the classification and
make the final agency decision. The final agency decision is subject to
judicial review pursuant to the provisions of Section 63-46b-15.
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10-4.(3) The employee shall agree to repay any such
assistance which was received for educational work
completed in the year immediately preceding voluntary
termination
10-4.(4) Education assistance shall not exceed $1,500
in any one fiscal year. Agencies shall have the prerogative of approving program participation of any one
employee up to and including $1,500, but shall use contract requirements and standards approved by DHRM.
Agencies which subsidize education of employees
beyond the $1,500 amount shall receive approval of the
respective department head.
10-4.(5) When an agency directs an employee to participate in an educational program, then the agency
shall fully pay the costs thereof.
KEY: educational tuitions, employee performance evaluation*
employee
productivity,
human
resource*
development,
personnel management, training program!
1991
67-l5-6<6)

R477-1L Discipline.
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action.
R477-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion.
R477-11-1. Disciplinary Action.
Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety
policies, professional standards adopted by a department, work place policies, and such matters as inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills,
adequate performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance in office, or failure to advance the
good of the public interest shall be cause for disciplinary action. For purposes of R477-11, employee shall
mean career service employee unless indicated otherwise.
11-1.(1) The type and severity of any disciplinary
action taken shall be governed by principles of due process which include:
(l)(a) Consistent application
(1Kb) Prior knowledge of rules and standards
(lXc) Determination of fact
(1 )(d) Timely notice of noncompliance
(IKe) Opportunity to respond and rebut as defined
herein
11-1.(2) If the agency determines that a career service
employee is charged with aggravated or repetitive misconduct or that the retention of a career service
employee would endanger the peace and safety of others or pose a grave threat to the public interest, the
agency, pending an investigation to determine fact
upon which disciplinary action may be taken, shall utilize one or more of the following options.
(2)(a) The employee may be placed on paid administrative leave (suspension with pay).
(2Kb) The employee may be temporarily reassigned to
another position or different work location at the same
rate of pay pending the completion of the investigation.
11-1.(3) In all cases, except as provided under Section
67-19-18(4) the disciplinary process includes the following:
(3)(a) The agency representative notifies the
employee in writing of the proposed discipline and the

R477-11-2

(3)(b) The employee has five working days within
which to reply and have the reply considered by the
agency representative before discipline is imposed;
(3Xc) If an employee waives the right to respond or
does not reply within the time frames stated in these
rules or as established by the agency representative,
whichever is longer, discipline may still be imposed in
accordance with these rules.
(3)(d) The employee and the agency representative
may agree in writing to waive or extend any grievance
step, or the time limits specified for any grievance step.
11-1.(4) After an employee has been informed of the
reasons for the proposed discipline and has been given
an opportunity to respond and be responded to, discipline may be imposed by the agency representative as
appropriate. In determining the specific type and severity of the discipline to be taken, consideration may be
given to such factors as the severity of the infraction,
the repeated nature of violations, prior disciplinary/corrective actions, previous oral warnings, written warnings and discussions, the employee's past work record,
the effect on agency operations, and the potential of the
violations for causing damage to persons or property.
Disciplinary action may include one or more of the following options:
(4)(a) Written reprimand.
(4Kb) Suspension of the employee without pay up to
30 calendar days per occurrence requiring discipline.
(4)(c) Demotion of the employee utilizing one of the
following methods as provided by law:
1) An employee may be moved from a position in one
class to a position in another class having a lower
entrance salary if the duties of the position have been
reduced for disciplinary reasons.
2) A demotion within the employee's current pay
range may be accomplished by lowering the employee's
salary rate back on the range, as determined by the
department head or designee.
(4)(d) A department head shall dismiss or demote an
employee only in accordance with the provision of Section 67-19-18 (5). See R477-11-2 of these rules.
(4Xe) Disciplinary actions are subject to the grievance
and appeals procedure as provided by law.
11-1.(5) At the time disciplinary action is imposed the
employee shall be notified in writing of the discipline,
the reasons for the discipline, the effective date and
length of the discipline and the standard of conduct necessary to avoid further discipline.
R477-11-2. Dismissal or Demotion.
An employee may be dismissed or demoted for cause
as explained under R477- 10-2 and 11-1 of these rules
as follows:
11-2.(1) A department head or appointing officer may
dismiss an employee having other than career service
status, without right of appeal, upon providing written
notification to the employee specifying the reasons for
the dismissal and the effective date.
11-2.(2) No employee shall be dismissed or demoted
from a career service position unless the department
head or designee has observed the following procedures
and the Grievance Procedure Rules:
(2)(a) The department head or designee shall notify
•u~
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•
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R137-1-15. P r o c e d u r e For Grieving Reduction in
Force.
Grievances based upon a reduction in force shall be
governed as follows:
A. Upon receiving the department head's final written
decision, the employee may grieve that decision by filing a written request within 20 working days in the
CSRB Office.
B. If timely and properly filed, the grievance shall be
advanced to the evidentiary level/step 5 at the discretion of the administrator.
R137-M6. Jurisdictional Hearings.
A. Procedural Issues. The administrator is empowered to determine the following:
1. timeliness, standing, direct harm, jurisdiction, and
eligibility of the issues to be advanced, as well as any
other procedural matters to be decided by the administrator; and
2. whether an employee has proper standing to process a claim.
B. Determination of Issues. The administrator shall
determine which issues of a grievance may be heard at
the evidentiary level. Those issues found to have been
resolved at a lower level or those that do not qualify for
advancement to the evidentiary level are precluded
from further consideration in the grievance procedure.
C. Preclusion of Issues. Those issues not listed at Section 67-19a-302(l) are precluded from advancement to
the evidentiary level. When the grievance issue is precluded from the evidentiary level, the matter under dispute shall be deemed as final at the level of the
department head/step 4 written reply.
D. Reconsideration. Under Section 63-46M3, a written request for reconsideration may be filed with the
administrator within 30 days after the date that a jurisdictional hearing decision or an administrative review
decision is issued.
E. Judicial Review. The aggrieved employee or the
agency may appeal the administrator's decision to the
Court of Appeals within 30 calendar days from the date
of issuance of a written decision. Any petition for review
to the Court of Appeals shall be pursuant to Section 6346b-16.
F. Summary Judgment. The administrator may, pursuant to an administrative review of the procedural factors of a grievance case, summarily dispose of such case
on grounds that: (1) the matter is untimely; (2) the
grievant has failed to appear at the properly scheduled
date, time, and place pursuant to written notice; (3) the
grievant lacks standing; (4) the grievant has withdrawn or otherwise abandoned his grievance; (5) the
grievant has not been directly harmed; (6) the issue
grieved does not qualify to be advanced beyond step 4;
or (7) the requested remedy or relief exceeds the scope
of the grievance procedure.
G. TVanscription and TVanscript Fees. If a party
appeals a jurisdictional hearing decision to the Court of
Appeals or to District Court, the appealing party is
responsible for paying all transcription costs and any
transcript fees. The CSRB does not participate in the
payment of such fees when appeals are taken to the
courts. See Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 11,
and Utah Cnda ITn««™*of^

C—*:~- *» "t_ «~<~
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under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act.
R137-1-17. Procedural Matters.
The rules under this section pertain to jurisdictional
and evidentiary level proceedings of the Career Service
Review Board, not to appellate proceedings.
A. Conduct. The purpose of a hearing is to provide a
fair and impartial opportunity to be heard so that the
hearing officer may be completely informed in the matter and enabled to render a proper determination based
on all the facts and applicable laws and rules.
B. Formal Adjudication. For purposes of Section 6346b-4 of the Administrative Procedures Act, all adjudicative proceedings of the Career Service Review Board
are to be construed as formal adjudicative proceedings.
C. Rules of Evidence/Procedure Inapplicable. The
technical rules of evidence and the formal rules of civil
procedure as observed in the courts of law are inapplicable to grievance procedure proceedings, except for the
rules of privilege as recognized by law.
D. Expelling. The hearing officer may clear the proceeding of witnesses not under examination and may
exclude any unruly or disruptive person.
E. Presentation of Case. Each party is given the
opportunity to make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. At the appropriate time each party is
given the opportunity to present evidence. After each
party has presented its respective case, the moving
party, followed by the responding party, may offer a
closing statement. Each party may offer a brief rebuttal
statement in the same order of presentation. Continuous rebuttal is not permissible.
F. Objections. When an objection is made as to the
admissibility of evidence, the objection shall be noted
for the record and a ruling made thereon or taken under
advisement to be ruled upon later. The hearing officer
has discretion to exclude inadmissible evidence or to
order that cumulative evidence be discontinued; parties
objecting to the introduction of evidence shall state the
precise grounds of the objection at the time such evidence is offered.
G. Marking Exhibits. All exhibits shall be numerically marked in the order that they are received into
evidence.
H. Motion to Dismiss. The hearing officer may, upon
motion of the party present or upon his own motion, dismiss the grievance matter with due regard for the standard of excusable neglect, which standard is for good
cause shown.
I. Consolidation of Grievances. Those grievances
found to be the same or of a sufficiently similar context
may be consolidated by the administrator for purposes
of conducting a joint hearing to facilitate economy in
expenses, time, and witnesses.
J. Standard of Proof. In all hearings, the standard of
proof is the substantial evidence standard.
K. Hearsay Evidence. Hearsay evidence is admissible
in grievance procedure proceedings pursuant to Section
63-46b-10(3).
L. Page Limitation. All written motions, pleadings,
briefs, and memoranda for all Career Service Review
Board proceedings shall not exceed 20 typed, doublespaced 8-V2 x 11 inch pages, exclusive of anv statement
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page limitation provisions shall be timely filed in writing, and not in excess of ten double- spaced 8-V2 x 11
inch pages. The applicant party has the burden to offer
sufficient justification for requests in excess of 20 and
10 pages respectively to the Board for the granting of
any exceptions to the page limitation rule.
2. The Board shall weigh all requests to exceed the
page limitation rule based upon the reasonableness
and necessity of such requests in light of each case and
its circumstances. The Board may not automatically
grant exceptions simply on the basis of a request.
R137-l-ia Witnesses
A. Availability of State Employees Tb Testify. Every
agency shall be responsible for making available any of
its employees who are requested to testify in a hearing
under these rules.
1. Off Duty Employees. Agencies are not responsible
for making available employees who are off duty; on
sick, annual or other approved leave; or who* for any
other reason, are not at work during the time the hearing is in progress.
2. Nondisruption. The parties, their legal representatives, and the administrator shall make every effort
possible to avoid disruption to the operation of state
government in the calling of state employees to give testimony in hearings under these rules.
3. Witness List All parties to a proceeding are to submit prior to the proceeding a list of witnesses expected
to be called. This list is to be provided to all parties of
record, and a copy is to be filed with the administrator.
The witness list is to be offered at the prehearing conference.
4. Witness Failure. If a requested witness does not
appear at the scheduled hearing, such failure to appear
shall not necessitate the postponement of any proceedings.
5. Excessive Witnesses. If the number of witnesses
requested seems excessive, the requesting party maybe
directed by the administrator to justify the request.
6. Witness Fees/State Employees. A witness fee is
available to state employees who utilize nonworking
hours and whose presence is required in a grievance
procedure proceeding.
B. Hostile Witnesses. If a hearing officer determines
that a witness is hostile or uncooperative, the witness
may be examined by the party calling him as if under
cross-examination. The party calling the witness may,
upon showing that the witness was called in good faith
but that the testimony is a surprise, proceed to impeach
the witness by proof of prior inconsistent statements.
C. Exclusion/Sequestering Rule. The hearing officer
may order that witnesses in any hearing be excluded,
that is sequestered, so as to preclude any witness, other
than the parties and their representatives, from hearing the testimony of any other witness. Witnesses not
presently testifying may be excluded on motion by one
or both parties. Witnesses are to be counseled not to discuss the case with other witnesses.
D. Management Representative. Prior to every hearing the agency's adjudicatory spokesman shall designate a management representative who is entitled to
remain throughout the hearing to represent the agency
at any proceeding. The grievant and the management
representative may not be excluded from the heai ing.

R137-1-2

E. Witness Fees/Nonstate Employees. A nonsta
employee called as a witness to a Career Servi<
Review Board hearing shall be paid the same fee ar
mileage reimbursement that is paid to a witness i
Utah's inferior courts.
R137-M9. Public Hearings.
The parties shall be entitled to an open and publi
hearing unless the exclusionary rule is invoked c
unless there are reasonable grounds to justify an exec
utive session.
A. Closing Hearings. All grievance procedure heai
ings shall be open to the public, except for situations i;
which the administrator, the board, or the hearin
officer closes by executive session either a portion of th
hearing or the entire hearing when substantial reasoi
exists for not having an open hearing.
1. An evidentiary/step 5 hearing may be closed in par
or in its entirety when the proceeding involves ques
tions about an employee's character, professional com
petence, or physical or mental health.
2. Authority to close meetings is set forth in the Utal
Open and Public Meetings Act, Section 52-4-5(1).
B. Sealing Evidence. The administrator, the board, 01
the hearing officer may exercise authority to seal the
record when circumstances so warrant.
C. Media Presence. All hearings at the evidentiary;
step 5 and appellate/step 6 levels are open to the media,
unless otherwise closed due to R137-1-19A above,
except that television cameras shall not be permitted at
the evidentiary/step 5 proceedings.
D. Dissemination. The administrator has discretion
to release copies of legal decisions, orders, and rulings
to a media representative upon the latter's request.
Portions of or entire legal decisions and orders may be
withheld if deemed to be of a privileged or confidential
nature, or if the record is sealed.
R137-1-20. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearings.
A. Authority of Hearing Officers. The hearing officer
is empowered to:
1. maintain order, insure the development of a clear
and complete record, rule upon offers of proof, and
receive relevant evidence;
2. set reasonable limits on repetitive and cumulative
testimony and exclude any witness whose later testimony might be colored by the testimony of another witness or any person whose presence might have a
chilling effect on another testifying witness;
3. rule on motions, exhibit lists, and proposed findings;
4. require the filing of memoranda of law and the presentation of oral argument with respect to any question
of law;
5. compel testimony and order the production of evidence and the appearance of witnesses; and
6. admit evidence that has reasonable and probative
value.
B. Conduct of Hearings. A hearing shall be confined to
those issues related to the subject matter presented in
the original grievance statement.
1. An evidentiary proceeding shall not be allowed to
develop into a general inquiry into the policies and
operations of an agency.
2. An evidentiary proceeding is intended solely for the
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purpose of receiving evidence which either refutes or
substantiates specific claims or charges. It shall not be
made an occasion for irresponsible accusations, general
attacks upon the character or conduct of the employing
agency or the employee or others, or for making derogatory assertions having no bearing on the claims or specific matters under review.
C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An evidentiary/step 5
hearing shall be a new hearing for the record, with both
parties being accorded full administrative due process.
The hearing officer shall give latitude and consideration to an agency's prior decision when the latter is
supported by the findings of fact based on the evidence.
D. Discretion. Upon commencement, the hearing
officer shall announce that the hearing is convened and
is henceforth on the record. The hearing officer shall
note appearances for the record and shall determine
which party has the burden of moving forward.
E. Closing of the Record. After all testimony, documentary evidence, and arguments have been presented, the hearing officer shall close the record and
terminate the proceeding, unless one or both parties
agree to submit a posthearing brief within a specified
time.
F. Posthearing Briefs. When posthearing briefs or
memoranda of law are scheduled to be submitted, the
record shall remain open until the briefs are received by
the hearing officer and incorporated into the record, or
until the time to receive such briefs has expired. Alter
receipt of posthearing documents, or upon the expiration of the time to receive posthearing documents, the
case is then taken under advisement, and the tolling
period commences for the issuance of the written decision.
G. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law. Following
the closing of the record, the hearing officer shall make
and enter a written decision containing findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The decision and order is filed
with the administrator and without further action
becomes the decision and order of the evidentiary hearing.
H. Disseminating Decisions. The administrator shall
disseminate copies of the decision and order to the persons of record for each party.
I. Past Work Record. In those proceedings where a
disciplinary penalty is at issue, the past employment
record of the employee is relevant for purposes of either
mitigating or sustaining the penalty in the event that
the employee is found guilty of the disciplinary charge
alleged.
J. Scope of Remedy/Relief. If the hearing officer finds
that the action complained of which was taken by the
appointing authority was too severe, even though for
good cause, the hearing officer may provide for such
other remedy or relief as deemed appropriate and in the
best interest of the respective parties.
K. Compliance and Enforcement. State agencies and
officials are expected to comply with decisions and
orders issued by a hearing officer, unless an appeal is
taken to the appellate/step 6 level. Enforcement measures available to the board include: (1) involving the
governor, who may remove most state officers with or
without cause, and with respect to those who can only

274

damus order to compel the official to obey the order; and
(3) the charge of a Class A misdemeanor.
L. No Rehearings. Rehearings are not permitted.
M. Reconsideration. A request for a reconsideration
may be made in writing within ten working days after
the date that an evidentiary/step 5 decision is received
by the party. The written request is to contain specific
reasons as to why a reconsideration is warranted with
respect to the factual findings and conclusions of the
evidentiary/step 5 decision. The original hearing officer
shall decide on the propriety of a reconsideration. A
request for reconsideration is filed with the administrator. Any appeal to the board from a reconsideration by
the original hearing officer must be filed with the
administrator within ten working days upon receipt of
the reconsideration.
R137-1-21. The Board and t h e A p p e l l a t e
Procedure.
A. TVanscript Production. The party appealing the
hearing officer's decision to the board at the appellate/
step 6 level shall order production of the evidentiary/
step 5 proceeding's transcript from the court reporter.
The appellant shall share an equal payment with the
CSRB Office to the court reporting firm.
1. TVanscript production cost-sharing applies only to
the appellant and to the CSRB Office. The former
receives the transcript original; the latter receives a
transcript copy.
2. The respondent may inquire of the CSRB Office
about obtaining a transcript copy, or may directly purchase a copy from the court reporting firm.
B. Briefs. An appeal hearing before the board is based
upon the evidentiary record previously established by
the hearing officer. No additional or new evidence is
permitted unless compelled by the board.
1. The appellant in a step 6 proceeding must obtain
the transcript of the step 5 hearing. After receipt of the
transcript, the appellant has a ten working-day period
to file six copies of a brief with the administrator. Additionally, the respondent must be provided with a copy of
the appellant's brief.
2. Upon receipt of a copy of the appellant's brief, the
respondent then has a ten working-day period to file six
copies of a reply brief with the administrator.
3. Briefs are distributed to board members upon
receipt from both parties.
4. All briefs shall be hand delivered, sent by the U.S.
Postal Service postage prepaid, or sent through the
state's Central Mailing.
5. Briefs shall be date-stamped upon receipt in the
CSRB Office.
6. The time frame for receiving briefs shall be modified or waived only for good cause as determined by the
administrator.
C. Rules of Procedure. The following rules are applicable to appeal hearings before the board:
1. Dismissal of Appeal. Upon a motion by either party
or upon its own motion, the board may dismiss any
appeal prior to holding a formal appeal hearing if the
appeal is clearly moot, without merit, not properly filed,
or not within the scope of the board's authority.
2. Notice. Written notice of the date, time, place, and
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DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
of the Industrial Commission of Utah
140 East 300 South • P.O. Box 11249
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0249
(801)536-7400
FAX (801) 536-7420

December 3, 1991

Charles D. Kent
Contributions & Collections
Dear Charles:
Disciplinary Decision
On October 4, 1991, Mr. Don Avery, Chief of Contributions, issued to you
a Notification of Intent to Discipline, in which he advised you of his intent to recommend
that you be disciplined by dismissal from this Department. You responded on October 23,
1991. On October 30,1991, Mr. Avery advised you that he had considered your response
and felt it necessary to recommend to the Administrator that you be dismissed from state
service.
Upon receipt of Mr. Avery's recommendation of disciplinary action and your
prior response to his intent letter, I carefully reviewed the information in both documents.
You were subsequently notified that I would conduct a hearing on this matter on Friday,
November 15, 1991. The hearing was held beginning at 2:00 p.m.
The issue in this matter is whether you should be dismissed from the
Department and state service to advance the good of the public interest for noncompliance
with professional standards adopted by this Department. Specifically, should you be
dismissed for having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude while employed by the
Department?
Based on the information contained in Mr. Avery's Notification of Intent to
Discipline and Recommendation for Disciplinary Action, and the additional information
provided by you and Mr. Avery at the hearing, I hereby make the following:
Statement of Facts
1.

On or about May 1, 1991, your supervisor, who at the time was Mr. Don
Avery, learned that you had been indicted by a Grand Jury for the crime of
Page #173
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forgery. The charge arose from an allegation that you had forged the
endorsement "Charles L. Kent" on a United States Treasury check. Charles
L. Kent was your father. Mr. Kent had resided in your home for several years
prior to his death.
2.

When Mr. Avery asked you about your indictment, you advised him that you
were innocent. You were temporarily reassigned to non-audit work within
the Field Audit Unit until the indictment was cleared.

3.

At the time Mr. Avery learned of your indictment, he asked you to keep him
informed of the progress of your case because of the serious nature of the
charges.

4.

On August 8,1991 you appeared before Judge David K. Winder in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah, case number 91-NCR-34W, at
which time you entered a plea of guilty to the criminal charge of forgery.

5.

You did not communicate with Mr. Avery either before or after August 8,
1991, about your guilty plea, until Mr. Avery asked you about it.

6.

On November 1, 1991, you were sentenced to five years of probation,
ordered to make restitution in the amount of over $18,000, and fined for the
crime of forgery.

Reasoning and Decision
The Department's Supervisor's Handbook (1990 edition, page 12-2) states
that an employee may be dismissed if he is convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. The
classification specification for the position of Field Auditor requires a Field Auditor to
perform audits and investigations of employers and collect contributions, interest and
penalties from employers. These functions have direct effect on the Unemployment
Insurance Trust Fund. Employees who handle Trust Fund monies and audit employers
must have high reputations of honesty and trustworthiness.
In our hearing you presented the defense that you are innocent of the charge
of forgery, and that you only pled guilty on the advice of your attorney. You stated that
you learned five years after your father's passing that his Social Security checks had been
coming to your home. You further stated that you believe your brother may have forged
the Social Security checks during all that time.
A plea of guilty is the equivalent of a conviction. Although you state that you
are innocent, I am bound by what happened in criminal court. In addition, I find it very
difficult to believe that your father's Social Security checks could come to your home for

Page #174

APPENDIX B (Page 3)

a five-year period and that you had absolutely no knowledge of the matter. Concerning
your belief that your brother may have forged the checks, you stated yourself that the
federal handwriting expert expressed the opinion that your brother could not have done
the forgery.
Perhaps equally important as your guilty plea was the fact that you failed to
keep Mr. Avery informed of the progress of your case. You stated in the hearing that you
didn't talk to Mr. Avery about your decision to plead guilty because a Department
employee was in court when you entered your plea and you concluded that Mr. Avery
would be told about it.
This failure to communicate occurred even though you were given specific
instruction on the matter. In view of the instruction you were given and the importance
of the matter to your job, I find it particularly difficult to understand why you would plead
guilty to forgery without letting your supervisor or the Chief of Contributions know your
intent. Your lack of communication and false denial on a matter so vital to both you and
the Department naturally has caused management of this Department to lose confidence
and trust in you.
Given the facts of your case, I have no alternative but to conclude that your
act of forgery and failure to communicate honestly and openly with your supervisor has
disabled you from continued effectiveness as an employee of the Department. Therefore,
you are to be dismissed from the Department and state service for the good of the public
interest pursuant to Section 67-19-18(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Your
dismissal shall be effective at the close of business December 6, 1991.
If you disagree with this decision, you have 20 working days from the date
hereof to file a grievance with the Career Service Review Board in accordance with its
rules. You may contact Mr. Doug Olsen of this Department's Personnel Section or the
Career Service Review Board, Room 1120, State Office Building, for further information
concerning your right to grieve this decision.
Sincerely,

ld/PC3
CDKDSSML
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his supervisor as an equally important cause for dismissal.
Grievant asserted that there were no specific rules of professional conduct delineated
in the Department's rules and regulations and that, therefore, it was an error for the
Department to cite the violation of professional policies as a reason for discipline. The
Administrator testified, however, that he feels there is certain professional conduct that is
"understood" in general by employees in positions such as Grievant's. It seems to be
generally understood that an employee' s reputation for honesty and trustworthiness must
be without question. This is especially true in a sensitive position such as Grievant' s when
trust fund moneys are involved.
Grievant's supervisor and the Administrator testified that they considered the
alternative of transferring Grievant to a different position where the issue of honesty and
trustworthiness would not be so critical, but that another position was not available.
In summation, the Agency determined that Grievant' s credibility had been damaged
by his guilty plea and by his failure to communicate about the indictment process. It also
determined that his conduct had constituted a violation of certain "understood" policies of
professional conduct.

The Agency further determined that it had lost confidence in

Grievant's ability to function effectively in his present position, and that a realistic
opportunity for transfer did not exist
Taken altogether, these determinations constitute a finding that substantial evidence
exists to support Agency's decision to discipline Grievant. The Agency followed its own
policies by holding a hearing for Grievant, and it exercised its discretion reasonably by
determining, from the hearing, that "adequate cause" existed for discipline.
C. Time Period of GHevant' s Actions
Grievant asserts that the actions for which he was disciplined did not occur while he
was in his current position, so that he should not properly have been disciplined for them.
While it is true that the forgery occurred while he was in a former position, the guilty plea
and the failure to communicate with his supervisor did occur while he was in his current
position. The actions that led to the finding of "adequate cause or reason" occurred in a
relevant and reasonable time period and were properly used as the basis for discipline.
D. Nexus Requirement
Grievant properly asserted that the Department has the burden to show the nexus
between Grievant' s misconduct and its detrimental effect on his job performance that would

6
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A reduction in force is governed by the Department's work force adjustment plan. A copy of the plan
will be available to all affected staff when reductions are necessary.
Retention points shall be calculated on all career employees by the length of continuous State service
and a job proficiency score. An average of the last three annual performance ratings will be used as a
proficiency score. When less than three ratings are available the average of those given will be used. Each
employee's job proficiency score and length of service score shall be added together to produce the
retention score.
The order of separation will be first temporary employees (TLNC), second probal ionary, and third
tenured employees in order of their retention scores. In cases of a tie, the employee with the least seniority
shall be released first.
Employees who are separated due to a reduction in force shall be given written notification of
separation. They may appeal to the Administrator for review if the appeal is submitted within 10 working
days from receipt of their written notification. The employee may appeal the Administrator's decision
according to the appeal procedure of the Career Service Review Board.
A reinstated nf d employee is not required to serve a probationary period and enjoys the rights and
privileges of a regular career service employee.

D i s m i s s a l s for C a u s e
Failure to satisfactorily complete probation period.
Failure to report to work.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Negligence, inefficiency or unfitness to perform duties.
Violation of Department or State regulations.
Gross misconduct or insubordination.
Written notification from the Administrator specifying the reasons for the dismissal, and the effective
date, must be given the employee.
The following procedures must be observed in dismissing or demoting employees having career
service status:
1.

The Administrator or designated representative shall notify the employee in writing of the
reasons for the dismissal (or demotion).

2.

The employee shall have at least five working days to reply and have the reply c onsidered by the
Administrator.

3.

The employee shall have the right to be heard by the Administrator or representative.

4.

Following such a hearing an employee may be dismissed or demoted if the Administrator finds
adequate cause or reason.

5.

The Administrator may suspend an employee without pay pending the outcome of dismissal
proceedings.
12-2
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Don Avery
c h i e f of C o n t r i b u t i o n s

Qntercffice Commtmicafion
Date-

)s

Cleared for Release:

September 13, 1991

TO:

Terry Burns, UI Director

SUBJECT:

Charles Kent

On May 1, 1991, I learned from a local office acquaintance
that Charles had been indicted by a federal grand jury of
fraudulently endorsing 10 US Treasury checks.
The next day I
discussed this with him and he assured me that he was not guilty.
He explained that his brother who had been living with him had
committed the forgery.
Charles has been under closer supervision since then and
will continue to be until the issue is resolved. His duties have
be^n restricted in order to reduce his handling of trust fund
mo ies. During this time Charles has repeatedly told me that he
wa not the guilty party, and that his attorney has assured him
he had nothing to worry about.
Now that he has pleaded guilty to the charges, I am
concerned about Charles1 continued employment in Field Audit. On
September 9 I again discussed the situation with him. He still
contends to be innocent and the only reason he pleaded guilty was
upon the advice of his attorney. His attorney counseled him that
pleading guilty to a misdemeanor should have no consequences upon
his current employment.
I disagree.
Criminal forgery of any
type, regardless of the degree of the crime, cannot be overlooked
when considering the integrity of our auditors. I do not believe
that it is in his or the agencyfs best interest to keep him
working in Field Audit or Contributions. I do not want him in
any position where there is the potential of handling or
manipulating trust fund monies.
If his offense does not justify termination, I request that
he
be
transferred
elsewhere
in
the department.
Your
consideration in this matter is appreciated.
DA/gb
KENT.MEM
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Vince Iturbe
Benefit Paymemt
Cleared for Release

August 8, 1991

TO:

Terry Burns, Director, Unemployment Insurance

SUBJECT:

Charles D. Kent

On Thursday, August 8, at 9:00 a.m., I attended the
United States District Court, District of Utah, in regards to
Charles D. Kent. A change of plea was introduced to Judge David
Winder. The attorney for the United States Government was Mr.
Gilson, the attorney for the defense was Mr. Bennett. A plea
bargain was entered into whereas the original ten counts of
misuse of Social Security funds involving the forging of United
States Treasury checks was to be changed from a felony to a
misdemeanor.
The plea bargain would involve full restitution of
$18,287. At the time of sentencing $3,000 is to be paid, and
during a probationary period the remaining $15,287 is to be
paid, plus interest. The probation period will be established
by the judge.
Mr. Kent is being charged with forging the
signature of his deceased father, Mr. Charles L. Kent; therefore,
defrauding the United States Government.
The judge made it clear that he would take this matter
under advisement, but is not held to any plea bargain. The judge
can still sentence Mr* Kent on the felony charge. The date for
sentencing is November 1, 1991, at 8:00 a.m. in the United States
District Court, District of Utah, 350 South Main, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
If there are any additional questions, please feel free
to contact me at 533-2081.
Vl/jat
cc:

Evan Mattinson
Don Avery
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SERVICE *i

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
of the Industrial Commission of Utah

M
Norman H. B*ngert«r
Governor
Floyd G. Aatin
Administrator

140 East 300 South • PO. Box 11249
3 ^ U k # ^ y ^ 54^7^249
(801) 536-7400
FAX (601) 536-7420

December 3, 1991

Charles D. Kent
Contributions & Collections
Dear Charles:
Disciplinary Decision
On October 4, 1991, Mr. Don Avery, Chief of Contributions, issued to you
a Notification of Intent to Discipline, in which he advised you of his intent to recommend
that you be disciplined by dismissal from this Department. You responded on October 23,
1991. On October 30,1991, Mr. Avery advised you that he had considered your response
and felt it necessary to recommend to the Administrator that you be dismissed from state
service.
Upon receipt of Mr. Avery's recommendation of disciplinary action and your
prior response to his intent letter, I carefully reviewed the information in both documents.
You were subsequently notified that I would conduct a hearing on this matter on Friday,
November 15, 1991. The hearing was held beginning at 2:00 p.m.
The issue in this matter is whether you should be dismissed from the
Department and state service to advance the good of the public interest for noncompliance
with professional standards adopted by this Department. Specifically, should you be
dismissed for having been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude while employed by the
Department?
Based on the information contained in Mr. Avery's Notification of Intent to
Discipline and Recommendation for Disciplinary Action, and the additional information
provided by you and Mr. Avery at the hearing, I hereby make the following:
Statement of Facts
1.

On or about May 1, 1991, your supervisor, who at the time was Mr. Don
Avery, learned that you had been indicted by a Grand Jury for the crime of
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afive-yearperiod and that you had absolutely no knowledge of the matter. Concerning
your belief that your brother may have forged the checks, you stated yourself that the
federal handwriting expert expressed the opinion that your brother could not have done
the forgery.
Perhaps equally important as your guilty plea was the fact that you failed to
keep Mr. Avery informed of the progress of your case. You stated in the hearing that you
didn't talk to Mr. Avery about your decision to plead guilty because a Department
employee was in court when you entered your plea and you concluded that Mr. Avery
would be told about it.
This failure to communicate occurred even though you were given specific
instruction on the matter. In view of the instruction you were given and the importance
of the matter to your job, Ifindit particularly difficult to understand why you would plead
guilty to forgery without letting your supervisor or the Chief of Contributions know your
intent. Your lack of communication and false denial on a matter so vital to both you and
the Department naturally has caused management of this Department to lose confidence
and trust in you.
Given the facts of your case, I have no alternative but to conclude that your
act of forgery and failure to communicate honestly and openly with your supervisor has
disabled youfromcontinued effectiveness as an employee of the Department. Therefore,
you are to be dismissed from the Department and state service for the good of the public
interest pursuant to Section 67-19-18(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Your
dismissal shall be effective at the close of business December 6, 1991.
If you disagree with this decision, you have 20 working days from the date
hereof to file a grievance with the Career Service Review Board in accordance with its
rules. You may contact Mr. Doug Olsen of this Department's Personnel Section or the
Career Service Review Board, Room 1120, State Office Building, for further information
concerning your right to grieve this decision.
Sincerely,

ld/PC3
CDKDSSML
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OgCKT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
MINUTES OFTOEUNITED STATES DISTRiqjWURT'rOR
_CENTRAL DIVISION

^

_NORTHERN DIVISION

^fc
c\G^9

\fl\^

^P^V
CASE NO.

CIVIL HEAiw,,.

m

X
DATE

M™~rf~,- 1, 1QQ1

9 1 NCR 34 W U . S . A . VS CHARLES D. KENT

HON. ALDCN J . ANDERSON

HON. BRUCE S . JENKINS X HON. DAVID K. WINDER

HON. J . THOMAS GREENE

HCN DAVID SAM

DEPUTY CLERK

Deana H. S c o t t

COURT REPORTERS

APPEARANCE

Jan*?? gJlSQn. AVSA

CRIMINAL HEARING

tpf

Ray Fenlon

OF COUNSEL

Wfinrfell

tenngtfr

Ronald QMifig, ProfraUOT QtflVtt

CALENDARED FOR*

IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE

Statements were made by Mr. Bennett, Mr. Kent and Mr. Gilson. Inposition of sentence
was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for a period of five years. All
of the usual conditions of probation apply, including the following:
1.
2.
3.

Not violate any laws, federal, state or local.
Report fully and ccnpletely with the Probation Office when they direct hixn to report,
Make restitution in the sum of $18,207.00, $3,000.00 of that amount is to be paid
within ten days from today, the balance of $15,207.00 plus interest at the rate of 5.42%
•^over a term of five years while he is on probation.
4. Pay fine of $2,000.00, to be paid at the rate of $50.00 per month, in addition to
the restitution, for a period of forty months. The money being timely paid is a
condition of the defendant being out of prison.
5. Financial records are to be made available to the Probation Office, when requested.
6. Pay $25.00 assessment fee.
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Utah Department

#

„

^ 0 * 4u-w*j

of Employment security chief of C o n t r i b u t i o n s
9ntatff/ice Gornminucatkm
Date:

0ctdber

4

'

Cleared for Release:

1991

TO:

Charles D. Kent, Field Auditor

SUBJECT:

Notification of Intent to Discipline

You are notified of my intent to recommend to the
Administrator that you be disciplined through dismissal from this
agency*
You are advised of this disciplinary action "to advance the
good of the public interest" [Utah Code 67-19-18(1)], R468-111.3(a), and pursuant to the following under R468-11.1 for
noncompliance with professional standards adopted by this
Department.
The specific reasons for ray intent to impose this
disciplinary action are:
On August 8, 1991 you appeared before Judge David K. Winder
in the United States District Court for the District of Utah,
case number 91-NCR-34W, and entered a plea of guilty to forging
the endorsement "Charles L. Kent" on a United States Treasury
check.
Since May 1# 1991 when I learned of your indictment, you
have assured me of your innocence.
I asked you to keep me
apprised of the progress of your case, but at no time did you
voluntarily do so.
I repeatedly had to request status reports
from you.
You also failed to inform me of your August 8 court
appointment and your intentions to plead guilty.
During this
entire period your actions have been less than helpful and your
intent misleading.
Contributions employees, especially those handling Trust
Fund
monies,
must
have
reputations
for
honesty
and
trustworthiness which are unquestionable. It is not in the best
interest of this Department to have you working in such a
responsible position as that of a Field Auditor subsequent to
yc^ur admission of guilt to a criminal act of forgery.
JCY\ UUjLgAx*

Don Avery, Chief of Contributions

I have read this notice of intent to discipline.
I
understand that I have the right to be heard and have until
October £ 3 , 1991 in which to respond in writing to the author of
this letter.

-I^b*** rQ#£

Charles D. Kent

Date

SO- 7'

91

DA/gb
KENT1.MEM
loyee /arestxmded in writinct 10-23-91.
J0v\ (AA4AA ,
Do" Avery, Chief of Contributions Date j£-2

^aSe
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CSRB
Agency
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY

ACCOUNTANT 17

Exhibit # 5

EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 27, 1969

POSITION SUMMARY: Under the general supervision of an Accountant Supervisor,
performs a variety of duties related to field auditing. Audits employer records
to reconcile them with contribution reports* Collects delinquent contributions,
Interest levies, and penalty assessments. Conducts the Department's biennial
status survey. Serves legal papers as required. Performs related duties as
assigned.

EXAMPLES OF WORK PERFORMED:
1.

Audits employer records to reconcile them with contribution reports.
Conducts audit at the location where the records are kept. Audits
payrolls, State and Federal tax returns, general ledger accounts
and other records. In case of discrepancies, computes amounts due,
determines interest, and collects or arranges for payment, or
certifies entitlement to refund if applicable. Checks weeks worked
and wages paid to verify eligibility of claimants for Unemployment1
Insurance. Instructs employers in the proper filing of reports*
Conducts special audits of employer records In cases of known or
suspected violations or misinterpretations of the Act.

2.

Collects delinquent contributidns, interest levies and penalty assess*
ments. Makes collection at the time of contact with employer,
arranges for payment at a later date, or conducts an Inventory as
a preliminary step in planning the legal seizure and liquidation
of assets to satisfy the amount due. Researches various public and
private documents in an effort to locate employers attempting to
evade payment. Conducts Investigations to locate hidden assets
when necessary. Makes collections for other states under a reciprocal agreement.

3.

Conducts the Department's biennial status survey. Contacts persons
or companies who may be employing others to determine if they are
subject employers as defined by the Employment Security Act. Contacts employers on an area basis. Personally visits new businesses
and checks other accounts if there appears to be a change in status.
Interviews employers, gathers facts and audits records. Fills out
proper forms and sets up accounts when indicated. Computes contribution amounts due, interest, and penalties where required.

4.

Serves legal papers as required. Receives warrants, garnishments,
executions, summons, court orders and subpoenas for service in Salt
Lake County. Files them with County Clerk's Office.

MINIMUM QUALIFICATIONS:
1.

Education and Experience
(a) Graduation from an accredited 4-year college or university, incl
ing or supplemented by at least 9 quarter hours in accounting, i
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CSRB
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Exhibit #
Doc. No. 2
Arc, No.
STATE OF UTAH DIVISION OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
APPROVED CLASS SPECIFICATIONS
Class Title and Grade: Field Auditor 21 Range: 0112 Class Code:
1362 Effective Date: 9-1-82 OT Code: STO EE0Code7 2
Distinguishing Characteristics:
This is a working level class with a probationary period of 6 months.
Under general direction performs a variety of professional field
auditing duties in the Utah Department of Employment Security.
Employees in this class perform specialized auditing, investigating,
collecting and related field duties under very limited supervision.
They make appointments and schedule time according to assignment
requirements. These employees have a working knowledge of the
Employment Security Act, its related regulations and precedent cases.
They serve legal papers and make determinations of wage credits for the
claims section. They perform difficult auditing functions on extended
field trips and contact employer and government representatives, lawyers
and accountants on a regular basis
Examples of Work: (These are intended as general illustrations of the
work in this class and are not all inclusive for specific positions)
Contacts employers to administer and enforce provisions of the
Employment Security Act; gathers information, discusses findings and
gives advice and instructions; examines and audits employer accounting
records and other supporting documents to determine compliance with the
Employment Security Act, rules and regulations, and judicial precedent;
reconciles and corrects reports; locates and contacts employers to
effect the collection of delinquent reports and contributions;
interviews neighbors and various witnesses to trace employers who have
moved; discusses accounts receivable with employers and arranges payment
schedules for those in financial difficulty; performs investigations to
determine the Unemployment Insurance tax status of new and existing
employers; may examine records and documents as well as interview
various employer representatives to establish employer subjectivity and
liability; contacts employers, accountants, and others to determine wage
data of claimants or to verify previously submitted wage information;
audits employer and claimant records to investigate suspected fraud;
seeks evidence of willful misrepresentation or collusion between
claimants and employers; may be assigned periodic field trips into the
outlying areas of the State; may investigate various governmental
entities to determine their status under the Employment Security Act;
may act in liaison with the Internal Revenue Service, the State Tax
Commission and other governmental agencies in obtaining information to
be used in the administration of the Act; performs other duties as
assigned.
Qualifications Statement:
A.

Knowledges, Skills, and Abilities
a—i

1

P a g e

#

18
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duties. By his failure to keep Avery informed of his judicial status as directed, and by his
later plea bargain (openly acknowledging his guilt to fraud), Kent breached the level of
confidence and trust which the Department's officials had placed in him. Due to Kent's
fiduciary capacity, this breach of confidence and trust constituted aggravated misconduct.
Therefore, the Department was justified in dismissing Kent in order to advance the good
of the public interest pursuant to §67-19-18(1).
4. The Departmentf s Supervisor Handbook lists as a cause for dismissal: "Conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude." (Grvt. Exh. 1; Agency Exh. 4.) Appellant, who was
not a supervisor or manager, had not received a copy of the handbook during his years of
employment with the Department. Appellant averred that he had no knowledge of these
professional standards prior to dismissal proceedings (T. 105). Admittedly, this handbook
does not apply the term "professional standards," but it explicitly sets forth several grounds
as dismissal for cause, including a conviction for a crime of moral turpitude. Human
Resource Management Rules (July 1991 edition), at R468-11-1, states in part:
"Noncompliance with these rules, departmental safety policies, professional standards
adopted by a department, work place policies,... failure to advance the good of the public
interest shall be cause for disciplinary action." (Emphasis supplied.) This provision of the
Human Resource Management Rules is applicable to all career service employees, including
Kent, regardless of whether one has personal knowledge of the rule or not. There are
certain moral standards, such as integrity, trustworthiness, and honesty, which need not be
written into an employer• s policies and work place rules. The public employing agency may
reasonably expect adherence to such unwritten universal moral standards, which if breached,
would substantially tarnish an employee's reputation and strain if not rupture the
employment relationship.
5. It is not relevant that Appellant had not received a copy of the Department' s
Supervisor Handbook prior to his dismissal. Proper conduct and professional standards
include certain moral standards that do not need to be explicitly written and disseminated
to each employee in the public work force. A serious offense in criminal law, such as
forgery, for one who holds a position such as an Accountant, a Collections Officer, and a
Field Auditor rises to a level of moral turpitude. The standard of moral turpitude need not
be written as a specific agency policy, which would include every possible infraction, since
a reasonable person would understand that such intentional wrongdoing and base

9
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13
Olsen (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel)
Q.

And in what capacity?

A.

Human resource manager.

Q.

How long have you been the human resource

manager?
A.

One year two months.

Q.

Are you familiar with the records

concerning the Grievant, Mr. Charles Kent?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q,

Have you reviewed those records in the last

day or so at my request?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And can you tell us the date Mr. Kent was

hired and the job he was hired into?
A.

He was hired on October the 9, 1984 as an

Accountant 17.
Q.

And is there a working title with that job;

do you know?
A.

At that time, I don't know.

That was the

official title that he was hired under.
Q.

Okay.

What status was he hired into?

A.

It was a status we call TLS.

for time limited salary.

That stands

At that time, individuals

were hired on a •-- it was a contractual period of
time to perform certain duties for a limited period
of time.

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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14
Olsen (Direct Examination By Mr, Zabel)
1

Q.

Was that a career status?

2

A.

Not at that time.

3

Q.

Do you have a class specification with you

4
5

for the job Mr. Kent was hired into?
A.

6
7

MR. ZABEL:

We'd like to have this document

marked as an exhibit.

8
9

Yes.

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

That would be

Number 5.

10

MR. ZABEL:

11

MR. DYER:

We brought one just for you.
Okay.

12

(Agency Exhibit No. 5 was

13

marked for identification.)

14

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

This is being

15

offered as Exhibit 5 after you have reviewed that,

16

Mr. Dyer.

17

MR. DYER:

I'm sorry.

18

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

Which one is this?
This would be

19

offered as Exhibit 5.

20

review and see if there is an objection.

21
22
23
24
25

MR. DYER:

I'll give you a minute to

I haven't seen A-4.

I've got

A-l, 2 and 3.
HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

I've got A-4 as

this (indicating).
MR. DYER:

Okay.

I didn't

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222

mark

it

down

in
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16
Olsen (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel)
1

MR. ZABEL;

We'll submit that as evidence.

2

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

3

will be received if there is no objection.

4

MR. DYER:

5

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

6
7
8

All right.

No objection.
That will be

received as Exhibit A-5.
Q.

(By Mr. Zabel)

Was Mr. Kent ever changed

to regular career service status? .

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

When did that occur?

11

A.

It was on January the 13th of '86.

12

This

changed to career —

He was

regular career service status.

13

Q.

14

you can tell?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Was he later promoted to the position of

17

Was that in the same assignment as far as

field auditor?

18

A.

Yes, he was.

19

Q.

And do you know from the records when that

20

occurred?

21

A.

That occurred July 23rd of 1990.

22

Q.

And do you have a class specification for

23
24
25

that position, field auditor?
A.

Yes.

There is three copies of that.

MR. ZABEL:

I'll ask that this be marked as

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222
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28
Avery (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel)
1

A.

Approximately three years.

2

Q.

When did Mr. Kent come into your unit as a

3
4
5
6
7

field auditor?
A.

Approximately the first of -- first of

1989, about January of '89.
Q.

And do you know what position Mr. Kent

worked in prior to coming into your unit?

8 1

A.

He was a collection officer.

9

Q.

Is that in the same cost center as the

10

field audit unit?

11

A.

Yes, contributions cost center.

12

Q.

How did Mr. Kent come to be transferred to

13

field audit?

14

A.

15
16
17

We had a vacancy for a field auditor and he

made application and I selected him.
Q.

Were you familiar with his work prior to

your selection?

18

A.

Yes, I was.

19

Q.

And can you explain how you are familiar

20
21

with his work, how you first came to know Mr. Kent?
A.

I first met Charles in 1984 when he applied

22

for the job as -- with the Department.

What we had

23

at that time is, we had four vacancies.

24

vacancies for the two field auditors and vacancies

25

for two collectors, and a registry was prepared

We had

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801

'

521

-"2J
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29
Avery (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel)
combining those requisitions so that all of the
applicants were applying for both of the jobs, and I
held the interviews in conjunction with Mr. Frank
Shaw at the time and he selected two -- Mr. Shaw
selected two collectors and I selected two field
auditors from that register.

That was my first

meeting with Charles.
Q.

So you knew about Mr. Kent right from his

initial hire into the Department?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How well did Mr. -- well, excuse me.

Let

me back up.
I call your attention to Agency Exhibit
Number 6, the class specification for Field Auditor
21.

Are you familiar with that class specification?
A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

And would you explain how the duties of

that job relate -- well, let me back up again.
Would you explain what the unemployment
compensation fund is?
A.

The unemployment compensation fund is an

accumulation of all the unemployment taxes that the
employers in the State of Utah pay to our Department.
Q.

And how do the duties of a field auditor

relate to that trust fund?
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1

A.

The field auditors have the responsibility

2

to audit employers, to verify what they have recorded

3

on their quarterly reports and make assessments based

4

upon those audits.

5

contact employers who are delinquent and collect

6

their unemployment -- their delinquent unemployment

7

reports and delinquent taxes that are due on those

8

reports, and they also have the obligation to

9

actually contact employers who have filed their

They also have the obligation to

10

reports but who have not made their payments and

11

collect the taxes that are in arrears.

12

the money that comes from those contacts will then

13

eventually end up in the trust fund.

14

Q.

And all of

I show you two documents that have the

15

title Performance Management Plan.

16

these documents?

Can you identify

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And are these documents specifically

19

Those are documents that I prepared.

related to Mr. Kent?

20

A.

They're consistent with the position.

21

Q.

And/ in fact, they have Mr. Kent's name on

22

them; do they not?

23

A.

Yes, yes.

24

Q.

And do these documents indicate the

25

objectives of his job as a field auditor?
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1
2

when he worked for Mr. Shaw?
A.

The only thing that would differ there is

3

that when he worked for Mr. Shaw, the determinations

4

had already been made and the taxes were in arrears

5

and he collected on those taxes that were in arrears.

6

Q.

And as an auditor, what was the difference?

7

A.

That was -- that was -- that was a primary

8

duty of a collector.

9

the liabilities and then collect on them.

10
11
12

Q.

An auditor can also establish

Would you explain who manages the

unemployment compensation fund?
A.

It's managed within the contributions

13

division of the Department of Employment Security by

14

our trust fund management unit.

15

Q.

Where is the money kept?

16

A.

It depends on where it's at In the process.

17

Eventually it will end up in -- in -- in the

18

Department's account with the United States

19

Government.

20

Q.

When you say eventually, is that a

21

protracted time that the Department holds it before

22

it sends it to the United States Government?

23

A.

Right.

We have a process where we collect

24

the money, we deposit it in a clearing account and

25

then it gets transferred into the trust fund.
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1
2

Q.

in the clearing account?

3
4

A.

Q.

A.

8

Q.

9

11
12
13
14
15

So the money is fairly quickly

transferred --

7

10

It's usually not much more than a two- or

three-day turnaround at the most.

5
6

And do you know how long it generally stays

Yes.
to the federal trust fund?
Why is it transferred to the federal trust

fund?
A.

Because that's where we earn our Interest

on the trust fund monies.
Q.

Is there any federal requirement that the

money go to that fund?
A.

Yes.

They have very stringent regulations

16

as far as keeping -- as far as getting the money

17

through the process as rapidly as possible.

18

Q.

Is the Department obligated, required by

19

federal law or regulations to put the unemployment

20

contributions into that federal fund?

21

A.

Yes, yes.

We have no option.

22

Q.

With respect to Mr. Kent's performance as a

23

field auditor, would you explain to the Hearing

24

Officer what your observations were as his supervisor

25

in general?
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1

A-

Yes•

2

Q.

Did he indicate what the indictment was for

3
4

or what the newspaper article said?
A,

He had conveyed the contents, and I asked

5

him if he would please either mall or fax me a copy

6

of the article.

7

Q.

And did he do that?

8

A.

Yes, he did.

9

Q.

And what did you do then when you received

10

the article?

11

A.

I called Charles into my office and we had

12

a discussion concerning whether or not he was the

13

gentleman that they were -- that had been indicted

14

and that the article was referring to.

15

Q.

And how did Mr. Kent answer?

16

A.

He said yes, he was the individual.

17

Q.

And do you recall the nature of the

18

indictment?

19

A.

20
21

He was accused of fraudulently endorsing

ten U.S. Treasury checks.
Q.

What did you do then after he acknowledged

22

that he was the same individual as the article

23

referred to?

24

A.

25

I asked him if -- if -- to give me a bit of

an explanation as to how this came about and was
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1

there any merit to this, at which time he gave me a

2

brief background of what had transpired and then

3

professed his innocence.

4
5

Q.

How did he profess his innocence to you?

Do you recall specifically what he said?

6

A.

He had said that he had had his brother

7

living with him and it was his brother who had

8

actually intercepted the checks and had forged them

9

and cashed them, and that he was not the guilty party

10

and he had no knowledge of his brother doing this

11

during that period of time.

12
13
14

Q.

Did you say anything further to him at that

A.

At that point in time I told him I thought

time?

15

that, you know, I had never dealt with a situation

16

such as this before and I would need some further

17

guidance from management on how to proceed, but in

18

his best interest and my best interest, especially

19

since this had now been made public notice in the

20

newspaper, I would like to -- I restricted his duties

21

as a field auditor to office duties, that he could

22

perform in the office.

23
24
25

Q.

What kind of duties would that have

included?
A.

Primarily working with the telephone to
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___

1

secure delinquent contribution reports, working the

2

telephone to secure status reports from employers who

3

had not registered with us, and anything else that he

4

could do that would still contribute to the operation

5

of the field audit, would still fall within his

6

responsibilities and job description but would

7

basically keep him at a lower profile.

8
9
10

Q.

Did he handle any trust fund monies in that

capacity?
A.

I would say that he probably still did

11

handle some trust fund monies in that sometimes the

12

checks will come in addressed to the field auditor as

13

opposed to just coming in in the general mail, and

14

it's possible that some did cross his desk.

15
16
17

Q.

Would you say that he was under closer

supervision by reason of these restrictions?
A.

That was -- yes, he was.

That was also the

18

intent, so that I could again hopefully serve

19

everybody's interest.

20

Q.

At the time you placed these restrictions

21

on Mr. Kent, did you say anything to him about why

22

you were doing it?

23

A.

Again, I reiterated that I had some

24

concerns about the image that -- that we had worked

25

so hard to improve as far as being state employees
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1

and being auditors.

2

with customer service, we had done a great deal of

3

work on public relations, and I felt that there was

4

some concerns that I had to take into consideration

5

in that if I had knowingly allowed someone who was

6

indicted by a federal grand jury for fraud to have

7

access to trust fund monies on a regular basis or to

8

have access to employers' confidential financial

9

records, it had potential embarrassment both to him

10
11

We had done a great deal of work

and to the Department.
Q.

Did you say anything to Mr. Kent about the

12

possible impact of this indictment and any potential

13

conviction on his job?

14

A.

Right.

At that time I don't believe he had

15

an attorney, but I told him that he needed to be

16

aware of, and that at any point he secured legal

17

Counsel, they needed to very strongly take into

18

consideration the fact that if he were to plead

19

guilty or were found guilty, it could have impact

20

upon his employment.

21

that impact would be, but common sense told me that

22

it would have implications.

23
24
25

Q.

I did not know exactly what

And did you articulate that concern to him

in writing or just verbally?
A.

No.

It was just verbally.
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1

Q.

Do you recall whether that was at the time

2

that you told him that his duties would be restricted

3

to office work?

4
5
6

A.

That was at that time and repeatedly during

the course of this situation.
Q.

Did you give him any instruction with

7

respect to the indictment and the prosecution that

8

was then pending?

9

A.

I don't quite understand that question,

10

Q.

Perhaps I can rephrase it.

11
12
13

Did you ask Mr. Kent to keep you informed
of the progress of the case against him?
A.

Yes, I did.

I asked him if -- if

14

throughout this process, if he would keep me updated

15

as to what was transpiring so that I was aware of --

16

of the situation.

17

Q.

Now, let's walk through the chronology then

18

of some of the events that followed at this point in

19

time when you placed him on restricted office duties.

20

How long was he restricted to office work?

21

A.

Okay,

Initially I verbally restricted him

22

to -- to office responsibilities on approximately May

23

1st, and at that time I then verbally asked my

24

supervisor, who is chief of distribution at that

25

time, Dean Kimber, for some guidance in the matter.
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1

nothing that he was -- the office duties did not

2

entail anything that was not covered in his PD

3

requests, position description questionnaire.

4
5

Q.

How did Mr. Kent react to this decision to

restrict his duties?

6

A.

He was understanding.

7

Q.

Did you have any further discussion about

8
9

his case at that time?
A.

Other than what's happening, where are we

10

at on this, and the continued reassurance that there

11

was nothing to worry about.

12
13

Q.

And this conversation and memo were on or

about May 20, '91?

14

A.

Yes, sir.

15

Q.

How long did he remain on restricted

16

duties?

17

A.

18

He stayed on restricted duties until his

dismissal.

19

Q.

20

duties?

21

A.

Why was Mr. Kent placed on restricted
Would you explain that?
Field auditors are a very high profile

22

position within our Department.

In fact, they --

23

they're really the only contact that most of our

24

employer community has with our Department on a

25

regular basis, and they're placed in a position where
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1

they're continually handling trust fund monies, not

2

uncommon, cash.

3

They also are very often in the employers'

4

offices where they have access to all the employers'

5

confidential financial information, bank information.

6

It's not uncommon to be handed a checkbook that

7

has -- still has -- that has checks in it.

8

uncommon for -- and this I have a hard time

9

understanding -- quite often, just to have a

It's not

10

checkbook where the checks are presigned.

11

not feel that it would be exercising good judgment on

12

my part to be putting someone who had been indicted

13

of -- by a federal grand jury into such an

14

environment and have the potential of someone, as

15

remote as it may be, having read this article or

16

through some way aware that Mr. Kent had been charged

17

with this crime and having to respond, then having

18

that taxpayer go to either the administrator,

19

Governor, or even, worst case scenario, the media and

20

having this thing blown all out of proportion.

21

Q.

And I did

Was there any potential in your mind that

22

this kind of access to employers' financial records

23

by someone under indictment, was there potential to

24

cause harm to the credibility of the Department in

25

the eyes of employers?
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1

to you with this information voluntarily or did you

2

ask him about it?

3

A.

No,

I had to ask him about it.

4

Q.

Did Kr. Kent talk to you from May 20th on

5

about his job duties?

6

complaints?

7

A,

Did he ever have any

Never received any complaints.

There was

8

probably a periodic exchange between us as far as his

9

job duties and the workload th,at he had and to

10

just -- the sort of thing that would go on between a

11

supervisor and an employee.

12

Q.

And when those kind of discussions

13

occurred, did you dsk

14

of the case?

15

A*

him fartlier about the progress

There were future discussions, yes # about
It'si mA

16

the progress of * he rase.

17

was, you know, every day walking in the office and

18

calling him into my office and asking for an update.

19

But when a week or two would go by and, you know, I

20

would at that point ask for some input as far as what

21

was transpiring.

22

Q.

something that 1

At any time did he ever come to you and

23

say, "I need to bring you up-to-date on my case," or

24

anything to that effect?

25

A*

Not once.
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___

1

Q.

you had to ask him every time what

2

was going on?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

How did you learn that there was some kind

5

of a court appearance to be made on August 8, 1991 by

6

Mr. Kent?

7

A.

To the best of my recollection, I received

8

a phone call from our benefit payment control

9

supervisor, Mr. Evan Mattlnson, asking if I was aware

10 I that Charles had a court appearance, and I was not
11

aware of such an appearance.

12

scheduled sometime in the fall, but that was -- that

13

was the extent of it.

14
15
16

Q.

I knew that one was

How did you know that it was scheduled in

the fall sometime?
A.

I believe one of our conversations where I

17

had asked for progress, I believe that Charles had

18

mentioned that to me.

19

Q.

But he did not come to you at any time

20

prior to August 8th to let you know that he had a

21

court date?

22

A.

No, he did not.

23

Q.

Do you know what happened at that August

24
25

8th court appointment?
A.

I understand that he had pled guilty and I
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1
2
3

Q.

Do you know what those treasury checks were

A.

Charles had told me that they were checks

for?

4

that had been -- that were intended for his father

5

who also was Charles Kent.

6

Q.

What kind of checks?

7

A.

I assume retirement checks, Social

8
9
10

Security.
Q.

What happened after you learned that he had

pled guilty, and specifically, was sentenced in

11 I November?
12

Let me back up if I way.

13

MR. ZABEL:

14
15

We'd like to formally offer

Exhibit Number 2.
HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

16

objection to Exhibit Number 2?

17

MR. DYER:

Okay.

Is there an

My only objection is, I think

18

our position, and I'll just make it now so 1 can pose

19

a continuing objection, our position is that because

20

of the fact that we don't think the conviction is a

21

basis to sustain termination under the items we set

22

forth in our brief, we don'i believe that the

23

document is relevant, but other than that, we would

24

have no objection.

25

in other words, our position is that
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1

conviction of a crime of moral turpitude

is not in

2

compliance with state law so this is not

relevant

3

evidence, but other than that, there is no

4

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

5

With

that

stipulation, we will receive that into evidence.

6

MR. DYER:

Before you go, Mr,, Avery, do you

7

have any problem with me just posing that

8

objection rather than interrupt

9

MR. ZABEL:

10

interrupt,

11
12

objection.

you?

That's fine.

Feel free to

too.
MR. DYER:

Q.

continuing

All right.

(By Mr. Zabel)

All right.

Mr. Avery, if

13

you would explain what happened then after his

14

plea and

15

A.

sentencing?
Let's see.

He pled guilty in August and I

16

had some verbal discussions with -- with my

17

supervisor and also the personnel department

18

you know, what we should do from here.

19

guilty

On September the 13th I addressed

as to,

a letter

20

to Terry Burns, the UI director, where I spelled

21

what basically had transpired, and concluded

22

letter that if his offense did not

23

termination, that I be requested that he be

24

transferred

25

Q.

out

my

justify

elsewhere in the department.

And why did you make that

request?
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1

A.

It was obvious now that I cannot have an

2

individual who had pled guilty to a federa. offense

3

of forgery handling trust fund monies.

4
5
6
7

Q.

And what happened then after you sent that

memo to Mr. Burns?
A.

I received a verbal response from Mr. Burns

to proceed with the termination process.

8

Q.

And did you do that?

9

A.

Yes, I did.

10

Q.

How did you do that?

11

A.

On October 4th I believe, I gave -- I gave

12

Charles a written notification of intent to

13

discipline through dismissal.

14
15

MR. ZABEL:

If we may see Exhibit 1, Your

Honor.

16

Let's try Exhibit 3..

17

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

18

MR. ZABEL:

19
20
21
22

I apparently put these in

different numerical order.
Q.
Numbei
A.

(By Mr. Zabel)
Mr. Avery.

This is Agency Exhibit

Do you recognize it?

That's the notice of intent to discipline.

23

MR. ZABEL:

24

MR. DYER:

25

Okay.

We'll offer that into evidence.
Subject to my continuing

objection, I have no other objection.
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1
2
3
4
5

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

Okay.

That will be

received as Exhibit 3.
Q.

(By Mr. Zabel)

And do you know what

happened thereafter?
A.

Charles responded on October 23rd with a

6

written appeal to my intent whereas he said he'd like

7

to stay in the field audit, but if that wasn't

8

possible, he would consider work else -- he would

9

consider work elsewhere in the Department.

10
11
12

Q.

All right.

And from there, what happened?

Did his response change your recommendation?
A.

No.

I was obligated then on October 30th

13

also to generate a written appeal response stating

14

that I had reviewed his written response and that I

15

was continuing with the process, and at that point, I

16

generated a recommendation for disciplinary action

17

through dismissal to the administrator, Floyd Astin.

18
19
20
21

Q.

Do you know what happened after you sent

that recommendation to Mr. Astin?
A.

Charles filed a Career Service Review Board

grievance form grieving the recommendation.

22

Q.

And thereafter?

23

A.

And then on November 15th, there was a

24

hearing in the administrator's office to -- it was a

25

dismissal hearing.
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1
2

Q.

A.

Yes.

On December 3rd Floyd Astin issued a

disciplinary decision resulting in termination.

5
6

And was Mr. Kent dismissed as a result of

that hearing to your knowledge?

3
4

MR. ZABEL:

That's all the questions I

have.

7

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DONALD AVERY

8

BY MR. DYER:

9

Q.

Mr. Avery, you referred to a memo dated

10

September 13th of '91.

11

your file that I can look at?

12

that.

13

interested in.

Do you have that there in
I don't have a copy of

The one of Terry Burns is the one I'm

14
15

___

MR. DYER:

Could we take a break for a

moment so we can get a copy of this perhaps?

16

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

17

Let's take a five-minute break.

18

(There was a short break taken.)

That would be fine.

19

(Grievant's Exhibit No. 2 was

20

marked for identification.)

21
22
23

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

Let's go back on

the record.
Q.

(By Mr. Dyer)

Mr. Avery, we have marked

24

here as Exhibit G-2 a copy of the memo which you

25

graciously provided us that you wrote to Terry Burns
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1

on S e p t e m b e r

2

A.

By Mr.

13, 1991; i s that

Yes,

Dyer)

true?

sir.

3

MR. DYER:

4

MR. ZABEL:

5

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

6
7

I'd move for admission of G-2.
No objection.
All right.

That

will be received as G-2.
Q.

(By Mr. Dyer)

Now, Mr. Avery, in this

8

memo, as I read it, there is no reference in this

9

memo about any concerns disclosing the August 8th

10

hearing date.

Is that a fair statement?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

Prior to becoming chief -- do you remember

13

the exact date you became chief of contributions?

14

A.

Approximately August of '91.

15

Q.

So it was real close in time to when this

16

hearing occurred?

17

A.

Uh-huh.

18

Q.

That's a yes?

19

A.

Yes, sir.

20

Q.

Oh, that's okay.

21
22

I'm sorry.

And Mr. Kimber was the chief prior to you
taking that job?

23

A.

Yes, sir.

24

Q.

And he retired?

25

A.

He resigned.
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1

Q.

Do you know why he resigned?

2

A.

No, I do not.

3

Q.

When he resigned, did he pass on any

4

information to you that Mr. Kent would have provided

5

to him concerning this case?

6
7
8
9
10

A.
he left.
Q.

leaving?

A.

12

Q.

14

So when he l*ft, he didn't give you any

sort of briefing on where things were prior to

11 I

13

He never -- I have not spoken to him since

No.
Did you, in fact, know on August 8th that a

court hearing had occurred thar day?
A.

I knew about It that morning; I believe

15

either that morning or the previous afternoon when I

16

received a call from Mr, Mattinson.

17

Q.

When you talked to Mr. Mattinson, do you

18

know if Mr. Mattinson arranged for someone to be

19

present at that hearing from the Department?

20
21

A.

Yes, he did.

He arranged for a gentleman

by the name of Vincent Iturbe to be present.

22

Q.

Mr. Iturbe apparently did appear?

23

A.

Yes# he did.

I got a copy of a memorandum

24

I believe that he generated to -- I'll have to see

25

who he generated it to.
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Avery
1

(Redirect Examination By Mr, Zabel)
A.

Well, within the framework that

2

restricted

3

him to the office.

4

to do the work in the field.

5

ability to do it.

6

he was trained and qualified, but because of what

was

7

transpiring,

him

8

out of the office.

9

his duties; in other words,

I had

restricting

I had a concern about his
Not necessarily

I rationalized

because

in letting

that by putting myself

10

employer's position.

11

representative who had either pled or been

12

convicted

13

had been found guilty of a crime of this

14

would

15

access to my most confidential information?

16

course

17

his

He could still do the work

I felt very uncomfortable

ability

in an

Would I want a state

-- who had been indicted, who had pled

or

nature,

I want to open up my records to him, give him

Q.

I would

Of

not.

As far as the ultimate outcome prior to

18

August

19

Mr. Kent had, in fact, committed

20

Federal

21

A.

No, I did not.

22

Q.

And why didn't you?

23

A.

I believed

24

Q.

When you say you believed him, again, he

25

8th, did you have any reason to believe
fraud against

that
the

Government?

him.

made assurances to you that he was

innocent?

TEMPEST REPORTING, INC.
(801) 521-5222

Page #3!

APPENDIX C (Page 37)

71
Avery

(Redirect

Examination

Zabel)

1

A.

Yes,

2

Q.

And when he pled guilty, how did that

3

he

By Mr.

did.

change your attitude?

4 I

A.

I quite honestly felt Betrayed.

5

Q.

Was your primary concern at that point with

6

Mr. Kent's pleading guilty or was it his failure to

7

voluntarily keep you informed on what was happening?

8
9

A.

I think both of them.

The fact that he had

consistently assured me from April 30th that he was

10

innocent and then goes in and pleads guilty, be it

11

even to a lesser charge, I found that very

12

distressing, and also the fact that -- that

13

throughout this period, I was the one having to

14

approach him to get updates as to what was

15

transpiring.

16

Q.

Why did you find it distressing?

17

A.

Because of the fact that we had been

18

friends for —

I had not only been his supervisor.

19

Before I became his supervisor, we were friends, and

20

we were still friends after I became his supervisor,

21

and for him to profess innocence, and I sincerely

22

believed that he was innocent through the

23

conversations that we had had, and then for him to go

24

into court and plead guilty, that just distressed me.

25

At what point then do I believe Charles in the future
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Avery
1
2
3

(Redirect

on any
Q.

E x a m i n a t i o n By Mr. Z a b e l )

issue?
So in other words, did it cause you to los

confidence in to what extent you could rely on him?

4

A.

Yes, it did.

5

Q.

Did you at that point begin to question hi*

6

honesty as it related to his work?

7

A.

No, I did not.

8

Q.

Did you at that point question in your own

9
10

mind whether you could rely and trust him?
A.

I did.

11

MR. ZABEL:

12

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

13

RECROSS-EXAMINATION OF DONALD AVERY

14

BY MR. DYER;

15

Q.

I have no further questions.
Any Recross?

In your mind, was this a decision involving

16

Charles' trust and honesty or more of a potential

17

credibility problem to the Department?

18

A.

I think the two were interrelated.

19

both apply.

20

MR. DYER:

21

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

They

I have nothing further.
Okay.

Thank you.

22

We will excuse you as a witness and let you sit back

23

as Department representative.

Thank you.

24

The next Department witness.

25

MR. ZABEL:

Could we take another short
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Astln (Direct Examination By Mr, Zabel)
1

Agency Exhibit Number 1.

2

A.

3

matter.

4

Q.

5

Yes.

Can you identify that?

That is my decision issued in this

Did you conduct a hearing to consider the

recommendation for dismissal of Mr. Kent?

6

A.

I did.

7

Q.

And is this decision evidenced in Agency

8

Exhibit Number 1 the result of that hearing?

9

A.

That is correct.

10

Q.

And that was your formal decision on the

11

matter?

12

A.

Yes, that's correct.
We'll ofrnr

13

MR. ZABEL:

14

MR. DYER:

15

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

16
17
18
19

it into evidence.

I have no objection.
Okay.

That will be

accepted into the record.
Q.

(By Mr. Zabel)

Would you explain your

reasons for determining to dismiss Mr. Kent?
A.

Yes.

It consisted of a number of things.

20

I guess the thing that really triggered the thought

21

process of reaching the decision that I did make, I

22

guess the document actually speaks for itself, but in

23

reaching the decision I made, I guess what triggered

24

it was the idea that there was a plea of guilty by

25

Mr. Kent in regards to a false claim made against the
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Astin (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel)
1

treasury, and then taking that guilty plea and the

2

nature of the facts that led up to that plea and

3

applying those -- that circumstance to the duties he

4

had with the Department at that time as a field

5

auditor, trying to determine whether or not this

6

would interfere with his work, and in my judgment, I

7

felt that it would, because the work that he was

8

doing with working as a field auditor, going out with

9

employers, auditing their books, determining whether

10

or not they had committed any wrongdoing with the

11

State of Utah or that their books were accurate and

12

reporting of their taxes, and also acting as a

13

collection agent for the Department, collecting

14

monies on occasion and bringing those monies back to

15

the Department, I felt that the nature of the -- of

16

the guilty plea or of the action that was performed

17

that led to the guilty plea were contrary to the

18

professional standards that this particular position

19

required with the Agency and that it would interfere

20

with his ability to perform his duty in that

21

capacity.

22

I felt that the high trust and expectations

23

of those working as field auditors were such that it

24

would -- it would jeopardize his ability to perform

25

the job.

However, in addition to that, the thing
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Astln (Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel)
1

that weighed upon my mind is the fact that he had

2

been advised and asked to keep the Department fully

3

involved with the matter as to wnat was transpiring,

4

as we found out through the newspaper that this

5

charge was brought against him by the U.S.

6

Government, and that was by accident.

7

brought to our attention at the time that we found

8

out.

9

and failed to do so, us being to his supervisory

It wasn't

And that he was asked to keep us informed of it

10

line, and he failed to do so.

11

they had to approach him each time as the information

12

was found out as to the nature **f the charge and

13

where it might be at any given point.

14

As a matter of fact,

And I guess finally, at the hearing that I

15

conducted after going through these very -- these

16

steps of review in my own mind as to try to determine

17

what disciplinary action should be taken, I was taken

18

back somewhat by the -- the demeanor or the approach

19

that Mr. Kent used,

20

didn't find any moral responsibility being expressed

21

by Mr. Kent.

22

issue was discussed, Mr. Kent seemed to take the

23

position that it was somebody else's fault.

24

didn't take any responsibility upon himself as to

25

what had actually happened.

I didn't find any remorse.

I

As a matter of fact, each time that the

He

He made it clear to me
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Astln (Cross-Examination By Mr. Dyer)
employee, but most of the changes —

most of what

goes on are changes, and they're generally posted on
a bulletin board, and that so employees, if they have
any concerns about it, they can make recommendations
about it.
Q.

Now, under this Dismissals for Cause

provision, you have, "conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude," which is what you cited in your
decision?
A.

Correct.

Q.

Can you tell me when that policy was

adopted and disseminated to employees that that is a
basis for dismissal?
A.

To my knowledge, this goes back many years.

I don't -- I'm not aware of any -- any dates on that.
Q.

So can you tell me with certainty whether

or not that information is actually conveyed to each
employee?
A.

Each employee is made aware when they

come -- employee evaluation when they first come to
the Department that this information is available as
to what standards are in employee handbooks and
supervisor handbooks.

Employee handbooks are given

to all employees and supervisor handbooks are given
to all supervisors for review by an employee.
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Astin (Redirect Examination By Mr. Zabel)
1

attitude that should be prevalent of a person working

2

in the capacity he was working in.

3

great concern, as I mentioned, that there would be no

4

remorse, no owing up to what had happened, even

5

though there was a guilty plea on the matter.

6

It caused roe

It certainly weighed in my mind, along with

7

these other factors, other conviction of the -- it

8

was just an environment that I was very, very
I

9

uncomfortable with.

I didn't feel that we had an

10

employee that would put forth the concern that we

11

have felt in this area of needing -- have someone

12

working with the employees that had those kind of

13

traits, that were straightforward and had an honest

14

rapport with the Department and were willing to work

15

with the Department.

16

didn't see any willingness to work with the

17

Department and to try to work out the problem at any

18

point.

19

happen.

20

Q.

21

The mistake had been made.

I

It was almost like it will go away, it didn't

Thank you.
Did Mr. Kent ever state to you either in

22

his hearing or at any other time that he had told the

23

chief of contributions at that time, Mr. Dean Kimber,

24

that he had an August 8th hearing date?

25

A.

No.

As a matter of fact, that did not come
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Astln

(Redirect

Examination By Mr.

Zabel)

1

out.

The questions were asked as to why he didn't

2

inform his supervisor, and that was never

3

he did inform anybody.

4

of him.

5

Q.

mentioned

That was specifically

Did Mr. Kent say to you at any time that he

6

had told Mr. Kimber or anybody else that he

7

to plead guilty at that August 8th date?

8
9

A.

asked

intended

Again, that was asked and there was no

indication of doing that.

As a matter of fact, the

10

frustration was expressed by Mr. Avery as to the

fact

11

that he let him think that right up to the point

till

12

he actually made the plea In court, we had no

13

knowledge of it.

14

came out of the hearing and there was no rebuttal

15

against that at all.

16

acknowledged.

It was a surprise to Mr. Avery

As a matter of fact, It was

17

MR. ZABEL:

18

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

19
20
21

I have no further questions.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR.
Q.

Any

Recross?

OF FLOYD ASTIN

DYER:
This testimony that you gave about what

22

said in that hearing, you are giving

23

conclusions?

24

A.

25

that

That's correct.

was

your

It was not recorded.

It

was a very informal hearing, although it was open to
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Kent (Direct Examination By Mr. Dyer)
1
2
3

it.
Q.

like there was any need for it?

4 j

A.

5

Q.

6

So at that point in time, you didn't feel

No.
What was the date of the check that you

pled guilty to; do you recall?

7

A.

September 3# 1986.

8

Q.

How much did that check involve?

9

A.

$310.

10

Q.

Why did you plead guilty to that?

11

A.

Seemed like the thing to do.

They had

12

taken handwriting samples from me on two occasions

13

and the result was officially inconclusive.

14

you're talking with these people, there is always a

15

constant threat

16

felony charges, and the felony charge would have

17

killed me.

18
19
20

Q.

thai

But when

t hay di/e tjotng to reopen the

I thought a misdemeanor wouldn't hurt.
Why did you think that?

Was that as a

result of consultation with your lawyer?
A.

Well, my attorney assured me that he had

21

handled other cases for other state employees and a

22

misdemeanor wouldn't hurt.

23

Q.

Who was your lawyer on that?

24

A.

Wendell Bennett.

25

Q.

Did the cost factor of what it would cost
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Kent

1

( C r o s s - E x a m i n a t i o n By Mr.

A.

No.

Zabel)

Up until that time/ I was dealing

2

strictly with Mr. Kimber

3

open up my file and talk to him.

I'd go into his office,

4

Q.

You were deali ng strictly with Mr. Kimber?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Not with Mr. A very?

7

A.

Pretty much wi th Mr. Kimber.

8

Q.

Did Mr. Avery ask you to keep him informed?

9

A.

Not specifical ly, no.

10

Q.

Not specifical ly?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

That's your te stimony under oath?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Why did you ke ep Mr. Kimber informed, if

15
16
17
18
19
20

you did?
A.

Because I thou ght he was a friend and I

thought h e was the one I should talk to.
Q.

Did you tell h im that you intended to plead

guilty on August 8th?
A.

No, because he left prior to -- no.

21

right about that time/ b ut no.

22

I was goi ng to plead gui lty.

23
24
25

Q.

It was

1 didn't tell anybody

How many times did you talk to Mr. Kimber

about it?
A.

At least half a dozen.
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Kent (Cross-Examinatlon By Mr. Zabel)
1

A.

Originally ten.

2

Q.

And, in fact, checks had been charged, or

3

at least the Government was alleging that checks had

4

been charged for at least several years prior to

5

1986, hadn't they?

6

A.

For five years, yes.

7

Q.

A five-year period.

When you pled guilty,

8

did the Judge ask you if you were pleading guilty

9

because of the plea bargain or because you were

10

guilty?

11

A.

12

plea bargain.

13

Q.

They asked me -- they tried to pin down
They asked me several questions.

Did the Judge specifically ask you if you

14

were pleading guilty because, in fact, you werf

15

guilty?

16

A.

Yes, I think he did.

17

Q.

And what did you answer to that?

18

A.

Yes.

My attorneys instructed me to.

19

MR. ZABEL:

20

HEARING OFFICER GUYON:

21

MR. DYER:

Any Redirect?

Just one follow-up.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION OF CHARLES D. KENT

22
23

BY MR. DYER:

24

Q.

25

I have no further questions.

You told the Judge that, in fact, you were

guilty because you were instructed to do so by your
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Avery
1
2
3

134
(Rebuttal - Direct Examination By Mr. Zabel)
Q.

Again, what were your instructions to

Mr. Kent about keeping you informed?
A.

Please, keep me updated on the progress of

4

the situation so that I'll know how to respond,

5

know how to react, so that nothing comes as a

6

surprise to me.

7
8
9

Q.

I'll

Did you ask him to keep Mr. Kimber informec

instead of -A.

No, I did not.

I was his immediate

10

supervisor.

This thing should have been handled

11

through me, unless Mr. Kimber had told me otherwise

12

and I was not told such.

13

MR. ZABEL:

14

MR. DYER:

15

I have no further questions.
Two things I want to follow up

on real quick.

16

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DONALD AVERY

17

BY MR. DYER:

18

Q.

Mr. Zabel asked you if you knew about

19

potential allegations in January, February of 1991

20

and you responded yes.

21

because it was before the --

22
23

A.

25

Let me just see.

Clearfield?

24

When did he transfer to

Do you have the date?

MR. KENT:
A.

I think you meant 1990

March 1st of '90.

So then it would have been '90, right.
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